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DISCUSSIONS of price flexibility in the literature of economics are
not all concerned with the same subject matter. Three quite dif-
ferent topics can be distinguished. The first two deal with the
effects of price flexibility or inflexibility on the operation of the
system as a whole; the third deals primarily with the nature and
causes of price flexibility itself, and only secondarily with its con-
sequences.
The first topic considers the effect of price flexibility or rigidity on
the level of economic activity. Discussions in this area have frequently
been concerned either with the analysis of the Keynesian and
classical models' or with the development of certain other specific
aggregative models. On the more empirical side, a great deal has
been written about the effects which might have been expected to
flow from greater price flexibility or greater price rigidity in spe-
cific historical instances. Much of both the theoretical and empir-
ical work has been predominantly concerned with the flexibility of
the wage rate and its repercussions on prices, output, and em-
ployment.
The second topic contemplates price flexibility from a long-run
point of view. Interest in this area has been focused primarily on
the efficiency of the economic system in allocating its resources—
i.e. whether in the long run prices do tend to be determined by
competitive forces. The literature in this area is not so extensive
as that in the preceding area, perhaps because economists have, in
recent years, been preoccupied more with problems of income and
employment than with those of resource allocation.
The third category of price-flexibility literature is considerably
less homogeneous with respect to final objectives than either of the
two preceding groups. It is rather the common starting point which
1 See. for example, R. M. Bissell, Jr. "Price and Wage Policies and the Theory
of Employment," Econometrica, July lg4o; Oscar Lange, Price Flexibility and
Employment (Cowles Commission Monograph 8, Principia Press, 1944); Don
Patinkin, "Price Flexibility and Full Employment," American Economic Review,
September 1948, pp. 543-564
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suggests the treatment of this segment as a unified body of literature.
Writers in this area usually start from a consideration of the em-
pirical fact that during economic fluctuations there is substantial
variance in the relative price changes of different products and
factors of production, and they propose to investigate the causes
of this variance. Branching out from this starting point are a num-
ber of different definitions of price flexibility and a number of dif-
ferent analyses of causal factors.
It is this third topic with which this paper will be concerned. To
the extent that this literature also attempts to evaluate the signifi.
cance of existing price flexibility or inflexibility, it does have some
relation to the first two topics, but the following discussion will not
be primarily concerned with the effects of price flexibility on either
the level of activity of the economic system or the efficiency of re-
source allocation. Attention will be focused on (i) an examination
of definitions and measures of price flexibility in the literature, (2)
a restatement of the problem of price flexibility in terms of tra-
ditional value theory and a discussion of the determinants of rela-
tive price changes, ()anempirical investigation of relative price
changes and price-cost interrelationships in various sectors of the
economy, and ()theapplication of the foregoing analysis to cer-
tain specific problems. The paper will be divided into four parts
corresponding to this general outline.
Part 1 will examine the various definitions and measurements of
price flexibility which appear in the literature. These concepts differ
considerably, and no attempt will be made in this section to present
a comprehensive picture of the entire literature; the focal point
of the discussion will be the differences among the concepts, so
that where one concept has been discussed by a number of writers
only one or two of such writers will be mentioned.
Part 2 will attempt to evaluate the various definitions of price
flexibility discussed in Part 1in the light of a restatement of the
problem in terms of the traditional theory of the firm. This dis-
cussion will be especially concerned with developing an analysis
which will be applicable to existing empirical material. The sec-
tion will have two parts: it will explore the nature of price flexi-
bility itself, and, pursuing the question somewhat further, it will
consider the determinants of relative price changes in the economy.
Partwill apply the analysis developed in Part 2 to the observed
price behavior of various sectors of the economy, in an effort to ex-
plain why the relative price changes in the various sectors differ.
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Since output prices for earlier stages of production become costs
for later stages of production, the sectors will be classified as far
as possible according to the flow of goods through the channels of
production; the price-cost interrelationships in agriculture, agri-
cultural processing industries, mining, mineral processing industries,
and the distributive trades will be considered in turn. The analysis
will not be primarily statistical, although use will be made of readily
available empirical material.
Part 4 will test the theory of price behavior presented in Part
in yet another way. The behavior of various aggregative price in-
dexes will be examined to see whether their general movement and
relative differences can be explained readily in terms of the theory.
First, the actual behavior of the components of the cost-of-living
index will be examined to see whether their relative differences
conform to what would be expected in terms of the theory of the
determinants of price behavior. Secondly, the wholesale-price index
will be similarly examined, and its general movements will be con-
trasted with those of the cost-of-living index. The process of analyz-
ing these two price indexes necessarily raises the question of the
meaningfulness of an aggregate index, given the systematic changes
in the components which will occur if the postulated theory is
found to be tenable. Finally, the index of real wages will be ex-
amined in the light of this theory of price behavior. Although it
will not of course be possible in this brief analysis to offer a com-
plete statistical test of the theory, it will be studied in relation to
past statistical literature.
1. Definitions and Measurements of Price Flexibility in the Literature
IN THE mid-thirties, Gardiner C. Means published a statistical study2
of price inflexibility in the American economy which stirred up
considerable interest. A number of writers had been concerned with
various aspects of this subject before that time, but none of their
2 For the original study see Gardiner C. Means, Industrial Prices and Their
Relative Inflexibility, S. Doc. 13, 74th Cong., ist Sess., 1935. Parts of this original
study and in some cases additional supplementary material are included in the
following: Gardiner C. Means, "Price Inflexibility and the Requirements of a
Stabilizing Monetary Policy," Journal of the American Statistical Association,
June 1935, pp. 401-413; Gardiner C. Means, "Notes on Inflexible Prices," Ameri-
can Economic Review, Proceedings, March Supplement, 1936, pp. 23-24; The
Structure of the American Economy, National Resources Committee, 1939, Part
s, Chap. viii, pp. 122-152; Saul Nelson and Walter G. Keim, Price Behavior and
Business Policy, Temporary National Economic Committee (TNEC), Monograph
1, 1940, Chap. ii, pp. 11-53 and Appendix i, pp. 165-241.
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publications had had the explosive effects of Means's study. Means's
chief interest was in pointing out the presence in the economy of
inflexible administered prices, which, he claimed, had highly dis-
ruptive effects on the functioning of the economy and were largely
responsible for the failure of laissez faire.8 As proof of the existence
of inflexible administered prices, Means presented a chart showing
the results of a tabulation of the frequency of price change for 747
of the items included in the Bureau of Labor Statistics monthly
wholesale-price index over a 95.month period from 1926 through
1933. The frequency distribution of the numbers of price changes
for individual items was found to be U-shaped. To Means, this U-
shaped distribution indicated that prices could be divided into two
quite different types. The highly flexible prices grouped at one end
of the distribution(i.e. prices which changed frequently) he in-
terpreted as those which for the most part were market determined,
and around which traditional economic analysis was built. The in-
flexible prices at the other end of the distribution (i.e. prices which
changed infrequently) he interpreted as those which were admin-
istratively established and held for appreciable periods of time. Con-
sidering the frequency of price change as a measure of price flex i-
bility thus enabled Means to satisfy himself that two quite different
pricing systems existed: flexible prices, resulting from many forces
continually interacting in that part of the economy in which markets
existed; and inflexible prices, set by administrative action and held
constant,
One of the first comments on Means's analysis of price inflexi-
bility was that it did not and could not show whether the economy
as a whole had been shifting from market to administered prices.
It was suggested that the differences in the frequency of price change
found by Means might be a normal phenomenon, and that the
period examined was no different in this respect from previous
periods. A number of writers undertook to discover whether any
evidence could be found that in recent periods an increasing pro-
portion of prices had fallen into Means's "infrequent change" classi-
fication. For this purpose, distributions of the frequency of price
3 Means, Industrial Prices and Their Relative Inflexibility, as cited, p.1.
4Don D. Humphrey, "The Nature and Meaning of Rigid Prices, 1890-1933,"
Journal of Political Economy, October 193'/, pp. 651-666; R. S. Tucker, "The
Reasons for Price Rigidity," American Economic Review, March ig8, pp. 41-
54; E. S. Mason, "Price Inflexibility," Review of Economic Statistics. Vol. 20,
1938, pp. 53-64; Jules Backman, "Price Inflexibility_War and Post War,"
Journal of Political Economy, October 1948, pp. 428-437.
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changes were made for periods as far back as i837. The proportion
of items falling into the rigid category in different periods was not
found to differ greatly and did not reveal a trend toward rigidity
in the more recent periods. Furthermore, over the period 18go-196
there was no trend in the actual changes observed in the component
series for each year expressed as a percentage of the total changes
which would have taken place if each series had changed each
month during the year.° These negative results seemed to indicate
that there was no adequate statistical basis for believing that the
price system was becoming any more rigid than it had been in any
previous period for which data were available.
The frequency of price change as a measure of relative price
flexibility or inflexibility was quickly supplemented by the ampli-
tude of price change. In his original presentation, Means had shown
that the frequency of price change was highly correlated with its
amplitude. However, he did not use amplitude as a measure of
flexibility, but rather considered it an accompanying characteristic
with further economic implications. Means demonstrated the re-
lationship between the frequency and the amplitude of price change
in two ways. First, he presented a conventional scatter diagram of
the two variables, which showed the existence of a correlation. Then
he separated the items in the BLS index into ten groups on the basis
of their frequency of price change, and for each of these groups he
drew up charts showing the distribution of amplitude of change.
For those groups with relatively infrequent price changes, he found
that the amplitude of change was relatively small.
This discussion of the relation of frequency of price change to
amplitude of price change was continued by a number of other
writers,T and the focus of interest quickly shifted to the amplitude
of price change alone, on the ground that this element was theo-
retically more significant for the incidence of price distortion in
the economy. But a simple distribution of the relative amplitude
changes of the various items in the BLS wholesale-price index simi-
lar to that which Means had made for frequency of price change
proved to be unhelpful, since the distribution usually came out
unimodal8 and so did not provide any convenient means of dis-
5Tucker,op. cit., p. 43.
8Mason.op. cit., p. 59.
7Mason.op. cit.; The Structure of the American Economy, as cited, bc. cit.;
Nelson and Keim, op. cit.
8Mason,op. cit., p. 6i; The Structure of the American Economy, as cited,
p. 128.
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tinguishing between flexible and inflexible prices. With a unimodal
distribution it was of course impossible to say what amplitude of
price change represented true price flexibility. Therefore, although
a great deal was written about price flexibility in terms of the
amplitude of price change and its effect in distorting the price struc-
ture, it was not very successfully developed into a tool of analysis.
In practice, the amplitude of price change was primarily used for
the comparison of the relative flexibility of specific groups of com-
modities—that is, the flexibility of chemicals and drugs as a group
compared with that of farm products as a group.9 In this sense it
was possible to speak of one group as more or less flexible than an-
other, but Means's original concept, that of a "market" sector of
the economy operating with perfectly flexible market prices, could
not be explored by this method.
A third concept of price flexibility concerns the change in price
per unit of a commodity relative to its change in quantity. A wealth
of statistical material on the price-quantity behavior of various
commodities and products has been provided by F. C. Mills'0 in
his various studies of price behavior, but these actual statistical
measures did not become a subject of discussion in the general price-
flexibility literature. Instead, writers on this subject usually confined
themselves to setting out lists of commodities or making scatter dia-
grams wherein the amplitude of price change and the amplitude of
quantity change were shown explicitly. Means, for example, in his
original study listed ten industries, for which he showed both the
percentage drop in prices and the percentage drop in production."
As was the case in his use of the amplitude of price change, Means
did not consider the price-quantity relationship to be a measure of
price flexibility; rather he used it as a part of the description of the
differences in the attributes of market and administered prices.
Similarly, scatter diagrams of ptice-quantity relationships have been
9 Mason, op. cit., p. 62; The Structure of the American Economy, as cited, p.
132; Nelson and Keim, op. cit., p. 3°; Backman, op. cit., p. 432.
10 F. C. Mills: The Behavior of Prices (National Bureau of Economic Research,
1927); Changes in Prices, Manufacturing Costs and Industrial Productivity, 1929.
'931.Bulletin(National Bureau of Economic Research, 1934); Prices in Re-
cession and Recovery (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1936); "Elasticity
of Physical Quantities and the Flexibility of Unit Prices in the Dimension of
Time," Journal of the American Statistical Association, December 1946, pp. 439-
467; Price-Quantity Interactions in Business Cycles (National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research, 1946).
11 Means, Industrial Prices and Their Relative Inflexibility, as cited, p. 8.
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widely used in the literature to show similarities or differences in
the reaction of prices of products having different attributes, for
example the pattern of price-quantity reactions of concentrated
versus nonconcentrated industries, and of durable versus nondur-
able goods.12 Like the study of the amplitude of price change, the
study of price-quantity reactions did not yield a meaningful defi-
nition of absolute price flexibility, but rather was used to establish
differences in relative price flexibility.
A quite different measure of price flexibility was introduced into
the discussion by J. T. Dunlop13 Employing Lerner's measure of
the degree of monopoly, that is,the ratio of the gap between
marginal cost and price to price (price minus marginal cost divided
by price),'4 Dunlop proposed the change in the degree of monopoly
as a measure of price flexibility. He argued that the degree of mo-
nopoly (thus measured) was more significant analytically than other
existing measures of flexibility because of its relation to the de-
terminants of output and employment. An increase in Lerner's de-
gree of monopoly for a given commodity during a period of falling
prices would mean that the marginal cost of the producer of the
commodity fell faster than the price of the final output. A decrease
in Lerner's degree of monopoly in such a situation would mean
that marginal cost did not fall as fast as the price of the final output.
Dunlop's measure thus attempts to relate the amplitude of the
change in marginal cost to the amplitude of the change in price of
the final output. His analysis of price flexibility thus differed from
the preceding analyses in that it attempted to take into account the
price-cost relationship within an industry. Where input prices and
output prices move together, the price of the final good is said to be
as flexible as costs. For the industries which he studied, Dunlop
concluded that the degree of monopoly increased in the depression
12 Willard L. Thorp and Walter F. Crowder, "Concentration and Product
Characteristics as Factors in Price-Quantity Behavior," A,nerican Economic Re-
view, February, Supplement, 1941, pp. 390-408; Jules Backman, "Price Inflexibil-
ity and Changes in Production," American Economic Review, September 1939,
pp. 480-486; Nelson and Keim, o. cit.
13 John T. Dunlop, "Price Flexibility and the Degree of Monopoly," Quarterly
Journal of Economics, August 1939, pp. 522-533.
14 A. P. Lerner, "The Concept of Monopoly and the Measurement of Monopoly
Power," Review of Economic Studies, 'g-'g34, pp. 157.175. In order that the gap
between marginal cost and price divided by price shall be equivalent to the in-
verse of the elasticity of demand, and thus measure the degree of monopoly in
Lerner's sense, it is of course necessary for the firm to be at the point of maxi-
mum profits so that marginal cost will equal marginal revenue.
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of the thirties, i.e. that the cost elements fell faster than the prices
of the finished goods.
Another analysis of price flexibility in terms of price-cost rela-
tionships was made by A. C. Neal in an effort to discover the im-
portance of industrial concentration to price flexibi1ity' On the
basis of changes in costs, Neal calculated for each of a number of
industries for the period 1929-1933 what the price would have been
if the overhead margin had been kept a constant absolute amount
per unit of output. This calculated price he called the expected
price. Actual prices that matched this expected price, he reasoned,
could be considered flexible. It should be noted that there is a
conceptual difference between Dunlop's and Neal's measures. Dun-
lop's measure of flexibility depended on the equality of percentage
changes in costs and prices, whereas Neal's measure required that
absolute changes in costs be exactly reflected in price, so that the
dollar amount of the producer's overhead margin per unit of out-
put would remain unchanged. Neal's study covered a much larger
number of industries than had Dunlop's, and the close relationship
which he found between his expected prices and the actual prices
led him to believe that the differential price behavior among in-
dustries could be explained for the most part by differential direct
cost behavior, rather than by concentration of industry.
More recently, Sho-Chieh Tsiang'6 has made yet another analysis
of price flexibility that relies on price-cost relationships. Starting
from Lerner's measure of the degree of monopoly, Tsiang further
develops the idea that the percentage gross profit margin (total
value of product minus prime costs expressed as a percentage of the
total value of product) is an expression of the inverse of the elas-
ticity of demand. In this respect, his approach is in fact a combina-
tion of those used by Dunlop and Neal. He follows Dunlop in that
he singles out Lerner's degree of monopoly as a starting point, and
as a result considers the percentage margin between price and
marginal cost rather than the absolute margin used by Neal. On
the other hand, Tsiang follows Neal in conceiving of the problem
in terms of a margin concept, which Dunlop did not do. Tsiang is
concerned with the computation of the gross profit margin for the
15AlfredC. Neal, Industrial Concentration and Price Inflexibility (American
Council on Public Affairs, 1942).
16 Sho-ChiehTsiang, The Variations of Real Wages and Profit Margins in
Relation to the Trade Cycle (Pitman, 1947).
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aggregate of all United States manufacturing for the period 1919
to 1937. This aggregative analysis is in marked contrast with the
interproduct and interindustry studies of price flexibility discussed
above. With the term "price flexibility" thus interpreted, Tsiang
found' that there was some evidence for the widely held view that
the price system in United States manufacturing industries was be-
coming less flexible. On the basis of his data, he felt that there had
been a persistent tendency since 1923 for the average gross profit
margin in manufacturing industries as a whole to be negatively as-
sociated with the average unit prime cost, i.e. that there had been a
persistent tendency for the average value per unit of output to
change less than proportionally to the changes in average prime cost.
A number of other definitions of price flexibility have appeared in
the general literature, but most of them have been incapable of ap-
plication as tools of empirical analysis. Mason, in his survey of price
flexibility, has given an excellent summary of these concepts.'8 He
points out that price flexibility is often used in a normative sense,
flexible prices being said to exist where actual price behavior co-
incides with desirable price behavior, on some definition of desir-
ab1e.' In this context, prices would be considered rigid not because
they change infrequently or fail to respond to changes in certain
economic forces, but rather because they do not behave as they
should behave if economic stability or some other desirable eco-
nomic objective is to be achieved. Mason also2° considers price flexi-
bility in terms of the rate or degree of movement of a price in re-
sponse to the changes in price-determining variables. As he indicates,
however, if all the factors which influence prices were included in
the list of price-determining variables, actual price movements would
by definition be completely explained and there would be no such
thing as either flexibility or inflexibility. For a concept of price flexi-
bility to have any meaning, therefore, the analysis can include only
some of the price-determining variables. To the extent that any of
these definitions depend on either perfect knowledge of all price-
making factors or on elaborate normative judgments, they are of
course not relevant to empirical analysis.
1? Ibid., p. 85.
18 Mason, op. cit.
19 Ibid., .57.
20 Ibid., p. 56. At this point Mason takes up Gunnar Myrdal's notion of price
flexibility which would "group all prices statistically according to the speed
with which they change under the influence of a changing impulse."
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2. The Concept of Price Flexibility and the Determinants
of Relative Price Change
DESPITE the large volume of literature on the subject of price flexi-
bility, there has been no very significant cumulative development,
and the majority of readers may well agree with R. S. Tucker21 that
the discovery of differences in price flexibility in the system is "no
more important and no less ridiculous than the discovery by Mo-
here's bourgeois gentilhomme that he had been speaking prose all
of his life." If one were to take into account all of Jules Backman's
factors and conditions which may affect price flexibility,22 the sub-
ject might be found to be of such a complex institutional nature
that it would defy any simple theoretical model. There are, further-
more, many quite serious criticisms, both theoretical and empirical,
which can be made of much of the discussion in the literature. Be-
fore proceeding further, it will be useful to consider some of the
criticisms.
One of the most serious questions regarding Means's U-shaped
distribution of the frequency of price changes in the components of
the BLS wholesale-price index was raised by Tibor Scitovsky.23 He
pointed out that the U-shaped distribution may be due only to the
particular form in which the data happen to be available, and that
the distribution of the number of actual price changes need not be
U-shaped at all. His argument runs as follows.
Means's frequency distribution is based upon the changes which
occur in the BLS monthly series. If the price of a commodity changes
many times during a month, the BLS figure, which represents one
monthly observation, obviously would not show it. Therefore, al-
though there is no limit to the actual number of times that a price
could have changed during the 95-month period studied by Means,
the largest number of changes that can appear in the data is 94. In
other words, the 94-change class interval would include all com-
modities from those which actually did change just once a month up
to all those which changed daily(i.e. roughly 2,900 changes in the
95 months) or oftener. The lower frequencies of price change would
be affected only slightly by shifting from a monthly to, say, a daily
reporting of prices; a price with zero change throughout the period
21 Tucker, o. ciI., p. 54.
22 Jules Backman, "The Causes of Price Inflexibility," Quarterly Journal of
Economics, May 1940, pp. 474-489.
23 Tibor Scitovsky,Prices under Monopoly and Competition," Journal of
Political Economy,Octoberii, p. 68i.
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would have zero change regardless of the time interval between ob-
servations, and prices which changed only a few times in the g
months would have months of zero change in which the daily
changes would also be zero. As the frequency of change increases,
however, Means's monthly observations would correspond less and
less to actual price changes, and at high frequencies it is quite ap-
parent that price changes would be greatly understated. On a daily
observation basis, the high-frequency end of the distribution would
be extended. The cases which now occur in the high-frequency area,
say from 8o to 94 monthly changes (i8i cases), would be distributed
over all the frequencies from 8o to 2,850.Thereseems to be no ade-
quate reason to believe that the distribution would remain U-shaped,
although again a slight cluster might occur at the high frequencies
for the same reason—prices which changed more than once daily
would be lumped with those which changed only once daily. If, in-
stead of daily changes, all actual price changes were recorded for
each commodity, it seems reasonable that there would be a con-
tinuously decreasing number of cases, even at the very highestfre-
quencies of change.
By raising doubts about the validity of Means's U-shaped distribu-
tion, Scitovsky in effect destroyed much of the meaningfulness of the
dichotomy between rigid and flexible prices. Without a significant
cluster at the high end of the distribution, there is no adequate
criterion of perfect price flexibility, so that Means would be forced
back into the same position as the writers who discussed amplitude
of change: frequency of change can serve only as a relative measure,
and no judgment can be made on whether a price is or is not flexible.
There have been other criticisms of Means's basic data. A number
of them attack the assumptions in the use of the BLS wholesale-
price index. One such criticism points to the prevalence of quality
changes, with nominal price kept the same. For example, according
to the National Resources Committee,24 during the depression a
shirt of quality and workmanship that originally sold for $1.95
could be purchased by the consumer for $1.69 or less. Yet the quoted
prices of shirts apparently remained rigid. Changes in price took
the form of changes in workmanship and style, rather than in the tra-
ditionally established wholesale price. Furthermore, Neal25 has
pointed out that the BLS price quotations do not always include
all the discounts which sellers give their customers, so that the quoted
2 The Structure of the American Economy, as cited, Part 1,Appendixz, p. 182.
25 Neal, op. cit., pp. 40-42.
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price may not be representative of the actual price. Thus, in the
BLS quotations, salt and fertilizer prices remained stable at a time
when in point of fact vigorous price competition existed in the
form of exceptional discounts. In considering the validity of the
BLS price data, the National Resources Committee26 concluded that
it was imperative to use caution whenever individual price series
were involved. In analyses of price rigidity, they felt, it was essential
that emphasis be placed upon broad and consistent relationships and
that reliance upon small differences in absolute figures be avoided.
A theoretical criticism of Means's use of frequency of change as a
measure of price rigidity and price flexibility was raised by D. H.
Wallace.27 He pointed out that in cases where no price-determining
factor had changed, the price, by definition, should not change
either, yet by Means's definition such a price would be considered
rigid. Furthermore, by his definition a price might well be flexible
even though it moved in the direction opposite from that which
would have been indicated by normal price-determining forces.
Means's measure is therefore not really relevant to an analysis of
the economic forces in the system.
The use of amplitude as a measure of price flexibility is open to
many of these same criticisms. It has already been pointed out that
the amplitude of change of a price series gives no clue to the abso-
lute flexibility or rigidity of the series; price flexibility in this sense
is purely relative. Most of the studies of the amplitude of price
fluctuation, furthermore, used the same BLS data which were used
in the studies of frequency of change, and there is reason to believe
that the difference between actual prices and prices quoted in the
BLS index introduces a more serious distortion in amplitude than
in frequency. In a period of depression, the divergence between
actual and quoted price may increase cumulatively. Lloyd Reynolds28
has shown that in a few cases there are major divergences. The drop
in the price of aluminum from 1929 to 1933, for example, was re-
ported as 5 per cent by the BLS, but according to census information
it amounted in fact toper cent. In the price of sulphuric acid,
a zero drop reported by the BLS was a 12 per cent drop according
to the Bureau of the Census. Further examples of disparities were
26 The Structure of the American Economy, as cited, p. 185.
27D. H. Wallace, Monopoly Prices and Depression," in Explorations in Eco-
nomics (McGraw-Hill, 1956), p. 347.
28 Lloyd Reynolds, "Producers' Goods Pricesin Expansion and Decline,"
Journal of the American Statistical Association, March 3939, p. .
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cited by the National Resources Committee study.2° Although these
disparities are probably the exceptions rather than the general rule,
they are nevertheless serious enough to raise questions about the
suitability of the BLS data for any refined analysis. Finally, with
amplitude as with frequency, it does not seem valid to consider a
price inflexible just because it does not change, if there has been
no change in price-determining factors. The fact that prices have
different actual amplitudes of change does not mean that they are
differentially sensitive to specific price-determining forces, yet this
is how the findings on amplitude have often been interpreted.
Mills's price-quantity ratio has never seriously been proposed as
a measure of price flexibility, in the sense that this term is under-
stood in the literature; Mills himself considered it to be a descrip-
tion of the general patterns of price-quantity movements. Given the
demand curve, Mills's ratio is the reciprocalof the Marshallian
elasticity of demand, but when both demand and supply schedules
shift, the resulting coefficient is somewhat ambiguous. The more
usual use of price-quantity relationships as a measure of price flexi-
bility, as was indicated in Part i, has been in terms of scatter dia-
grams for different categories of goods, and to this use many of the
objections raised with respect to amplitude and frequency also apply.
When the BLS wholesale-price data are used, some of the price-
quantity relationships which appear will be spurious. Furthermore,
the price-quantity relationships again provide only relative and not
absolute measures of price flexibility, and the measure obtained is
not directly relevant to the question of the correspondence of price
to price-making forces.
Dunlop's measure of price flexibility, as was noted above, repre-
sents a considerable departure from the measures which had been
used in other empirical studies. Unlike them, Dunlop's measure
does set up an absolute criterion for a flexible price. By this cri-
terion, prices are flexible when they move with costs. If price does
not change when marginal cost is rigid, the price is stable but not
necessarily inflexible. The fuller implications of this concept will
be taken up later in this paper, but it will be useful at this juncture
to consider some possible criticisms of the empirical side of Dunlop's
work. To obtain marginal cost for an industry, Dunlop took (i) the
National Industrial Conference Board index of average hourly earn-
ings for the industry, and (2) the BLS wholesale-price index for one
representative raw material for the industry, and weighted these ac-
20TheStructure of the American Economy, as cited, p. 183.
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cording to the respective importance of wages and materials in value
of product in 1933, as given in the Biennial Census of Manufactures.
The ratio of the change in marginal cost computed in this manner
to the change in the BLS wholesale price he considered to be an
approximation to Lerner's degree of monopoly, and thus a measure of
the flexibility of prices. If the ratio was greater than 1(i.e.if the
change in computed marginal cost exceeded the change in the BLS
price), the degree of monopoly would have increased, and prices
would be inflexible. If the ratio was less than i, the opposite would
obtain. Dunlop made yearly comparisons for six industries for the
period 1929 to 1935;andfor eight industries (four of which were
included in the first six) changes in the gap between marginal cost
and price were shown through the phases of the cycle (1929-1933
and 1933-1936) rather than from year to year. Dunlop's statistical
methods are thus certainly open to criticism. He used data from a
variety of sources which employ different industrial classifications
and have special unmatched definitions. Changes in average hourly
earnings, furthermore, have been shown to be a rather poor indicator
of changes in unit wage costs.3° The use of one representative raw
material for each industry (for example, the fall in the price of pig
iron as an indicator of the decline in all raw-material costs in the
steel industry) requires heroic assumptions. Reliance on the BLS
wholesale-price data for both raw-material and finished-goods prices
requires just that sort of dependence on the accuracy of individual
series which the National Resources Committee advised against.
And finally, in spite of Dunlop's conclusion that the gap between
price and marginal cost widens in the depression, by his own analy-
sis this was true in only four of the eight cases examined. However,
Dunlop did recognize the limitations of his data, and he intended
the article as a first approximation rather than a detailed statistical
analysis of the problem. It is certainly true that he brought to the
subject a completely new orientation, one which promised to be
much more useful than previous approaches.
Neal's work bears a marked resemblance to Dunlop's. However,
although Neal wrote some three years after Dunlop, there does not
seem to be much evidence that he was in fact developing Dunlop's
original ideas. Both Neal and Dunlop attempted to study the rela-
tionship between marginal cost and price, but Dunlop was interested
80Committeeon Price Determination, Conference on Price Research, Cost Be-
havior and Price Policy (National Bureau of Economic Research, 1943),pp. ii-
143.
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in the percentage difference between marginal cost and price, while
Neal was interested in the absolute difference. Statistically, Neal's
study was very much the more comprehensive of the two. Neal an-
alyzed a group of io6 industries from the Census of Manufactures
data. Since he used matched data from one major source, his results
probably have greater statistical significance than Dunlop's, and the
census data are probably also more pertinent to the study of the
effects of actual prices on producers' net receipts than are the BLS
wholesale-price statistics. Neal derived an expected price for each
industry by computing the price changes implicit in the direct costs
of the industry and assuming a constant absolute margin over these
direct costs. He then took the position that the extent to which his
computed "expected" price was correlated with the actual price was
a measure of the degree to which changes in direct cost could be
used to explain changes in price. There is, however, one major ob-
jection to this procedure. Although the correlation between his ex-
pected price and the actual price was high, there was a systematic
difference between the two: for the period 1929to1931,in82 out of
the io6 industries, Neal's expected price was higher than the actual
price, and for the period 1929to1933thesame was true for 72out
of 84 industries. When the expected price exceeds the actual price,
of course, the assumption of constant absolute margins is not in fact
borne out by the data; in absolute terms margins for the majority
of industries declined. But Neal was interested primarily in the sub-
ject of industrial concentration and its relation to price flexibility.
so that when he had proved to his own satisfaction that the degree
of industrial concentration was only a minor factor in price inflexi-
bility he went no further. He considered only manufacturing in his
study, and made no effort to see how the other parts of the econ-
omy_such as agriculture, mining, and the distributive trades—
fitted into the analysis. He was thus not concerned with the ques-
tion of why prices and costs actually did move differently from one
another, but only with establishing that the reason was not related
to concentration.
Tsiang used the same source as Neal for his statistical data; he
analyzed the data on direct costs and value of product given in the
Census of Manufactures. There were two major differences in his
approach, however. First, Tsiang considered only four sets of data:
the aggregated data for all United States manufacturing, and sum-
mary data for each of three broad industry groups—cotton textiles,
paper and pulp, and iron and steel. This is in marked contrast to
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the io6 industries studied by Neal. Secondly, instead of deriving
estimates of expected value per unit on the basis of constant abso-
lute margins and correlating the expected values with actual value
per unit as Neal did, Tsiang derived percentage margins and an-
alyzed their changes from period to period in relation to changes in
direct costs. In other words, Tsiang was interested in the behavior
of percentage margins as direct costs rise and fall.
The chief weakness of Tsiang's analysis lies in its aggregative
nature; this becomes especially important when it is recalled that
the differences in price and cost changes among the various indus-
tries are very great indeed. Tsiang did try one test of aggregation;
he examined the gross-profit margins of four different groups of
industries: capital goods, consumer goods, construction materials,
and producers' supplies. Because the average gross-profit margins
of these industries were all about the same in 1929, Tsiang concluded
that the aggregate gross-profit margin for all United States industry
would not be changed by a shift in the composition of industry due
to differential rates of expansion and contraction over the cycle.
However, many other types of aggregation difficulties might be en-
countered. Within an industry, for instance, it is quite possible that
producers with large margins would have a different rate of expan-
sion or contraction than producers with small margins. Rather than
attempting to prove that the process of aggregation is legitimate by
making various partial tests, it would be simpler to use somewhat
less aggregated data and study the behavior of gross-profit margins
at more homogeneous levels. In attacking the problem on such an
aggregative level, furthermore, Tsiang also neglected any explicit
discussion of the differential behavior of prices and costs in dif-
ferent industries.
Despite these criticisms, and despite the diversity of the approaches
of the various writers discussed above, certain common elements do
emerge. The major concern of all these economists is with the dif-
ferences in the relative amplitude of price change in the economy
during periods of economic fluctuation. Price flexibility as Means
conceived it became a subject of study because it was obvious from
even a casual examination that during periods of economic fluctua-
tion the price behavior of some sectors of the economy was quite
different from that of other sectors. Means would not have consid-
ered differences in the frequency of change significant if in terms of
amplitude all prices had moved approximately together during the
period 1926-1933.
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The importance of economic fluctuations as a frame of reference
for this consideration of price flexibility cannot be overemphasized.
The writers in this group gave very little attention to the long-run
type of flexibility mentioned at the beginning of this paper, nor did
they concern themselves with the question of how changes in produc-
tivity are transmitted through the system in the form of higher wage
rates for labor, increased profits for the producer, or lower prices
for the consumer, or with the manner in which the secular growth
or decline of an industry affects factor returns and prices in that
industry. Instead, they were interested in trying to see to what ex-
tent differences in the short-run cyclical price behavior of the differ-
ent sectors of the economy could be explained by the method of
price fixing (market or administered), the degree of fabrication of
the good (raw material or finished goods), the durability of the
good, and other attributes which appeared to be related to differen-
tial price behavior. Dunlop, Neal, and Tsiang, for example, were
interested in the extent to which the price changes of various indus-
tries in the manufacturing sector of the economy could be explained
by changes in direct cost as the single determinant. Backman, on the
other hand, listed a great many possible determinants of price and
implied that he felt most price changes could be explained only in
terms of a variety of determinants. Thus, in the context of the lit-
erature the study of price flexibility has been the study of the short-
run determinants of price behavior in different sectors of the econ-
omy during periods of economic fluctuation.
A mere review of this literature, however, still leaves much to be
desired. It is clear that the next step should be some consideration
of the type of price behavior that might be expected under various
assumptions, and an investigation of the extent to which this ex-
pected behavior corresponded to what actually took place. The re-
maining portion of Part 2 will therefore be devoted to the consid-
eration of the major determinants of price. Partsand 4 will then
examine price data for the various sectors of the economy to see
whether or not the differences in relative price change which are in
fact found can be adequately explained in terms of these major de-
terminants of price.
It has already been pointed out in the review of Mason's discus-
sion of the various measures of price flexibility that a definition of
price flexibility that took into account all the determinants of price
would be meaningless. Divergence between actual and expected price
in such a circumstance would not be an indication of price inflexi.
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bility; rather it would simply indicate that some of the price-deter-
mining factors had inadvertently been left out of the analysis in the
computation of the expected price. In other words, any concept of
price flexibility, except a purely normative one, must be defined in
a partial sense. A price can be called inflexible only if it does not
change when an expected price computed on the basis of certain
specified partial determinants changes. Before any analysis can be
made, therefore, the specific determinants which are to be taken into
account must be decided upon.
In traditional value theory, the major specific determinants of
price are generally considered to be cost and demand. Economists
have long recognized that cost and demand are not the only ele-
ments in price determination; such factors as expectations, the tem-
perament of the producer, and even public opinion may have an
effect on price, and in some instances inertia due to the difficulty
of changing prices once they are set may be important. If we exclude
all such factors in considering the determinants of individual prices,
however, the term "price flexibility" can be given analytic mean-
ing: to the extent that these excluded factors are in fact operative
and seriously influence the actual price changes, prices can be con-
sidered inflexible or perverse. As a first approximation, therefore,
prices will be considered flexible if they react as would be expected
in response to changes in cost and demand conditions, inflexible if
they do not change as much as would be expected, and perverse if
they move in the direction opposite from that expected. As the anal-
ysis develops, certain modifications will be made in this definition.
The framework of traditional value theory can be used in develop.
ing the expected reaction of price to various types of change in cost
and demand. The analysis will start by reviewing the price be-
havior of an individual firm or industry that is supposed to follow
various types of change in costs and demand under the us'ual as-
sumption of profit maximization in perfect competition and monop-
olistic competition; the problem of oligopoly will be considered
briefly at the close of the discussion. For simplicity in studying price
behavior under perfect and monopolistic competition, cost and de-
mand changes will be considered separately. Two questions will
therefore be distinguished: (i) how changes in demand would affect
price, in a situation in which cost conditions do not change; and
(2) how changes in cost would affect price, in a situation in which
demand conditions do not change.
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i. Under the principle of profit maximization, equilibrium price
and output will occur where marginal cost equals marginal revenue,
and the relation between marginal cost(which equals marginal
revenue) and price (which equals average revenue) will be deter-
mined by the elasticity of demand. (This is the basis of Dunlop's
use of Lerner's degree of monopoly as a measure of price flexibility.)
From this general observation it follows that if demand shifts but
the elasticity of demand remains the same, the firm should, in order
to maximize its profits, keep the same percentage markup over mar-
ginal cost and sell whatever it can at that price. With a horizontal
marginal-cost curve, for example, even though demand falls dras-
tically it would be in the interest of the firm to keep its price un-
changed as long as costs do not change and the elasticity of demand
remains the same. With a rising marginal-cost curve, a fall in de-
mand without a change in elasticity would require a price drop
proportional to the drop in marginal costs which would accompany
the reduced level of output. Thus if the elasticity of demand does
not change, a shifting level of demand would trace out a pattern of
equilibrium prices above the marginal-cost curve and in fixed ratio
to marginal cost at every point;' any change in marginal cost result-
ing from operation at a different level of output would be directly
reflected in an equivalent percentage change in price.
If the elasticity of demand changes, the relation between price
and marginal cost must also change. An increase in elasticity would
narrow the range between price and marginal cost, and a decrease
in elasticity would widen the range.
In a competitive industry, price is determined by the intersection
of the industry demand curve and the industry marginal supply
price. With a constant marginal supply price, any shift in demand
would leave price unchanged. With a rising marginal supply price,
a falling demand would trace out a falling pattern of equilibrium
prices along the supply curve. With a falling supply curve that was
compatible with competition (e.g. economies of scale external to
this industry), a fall in demand would actually raise price.
In summary, then, for the individual firm faced with a sloped
demand curve, a shift in demand which left elasticity unchanged
would require a price change directly proportional to any change in
81Ifthe marginal-revenue curve for the firm intersects the marginal-cost
curve at a point where marginal cost is vertical(i.e. discontinuous), a fall in
marginal revenue within this range with no change in the elasticity of demand
would result in a faIl in price and maintained output in the firm.
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marginal cost resulting from movement along the marginal-cost
curve. For a competitive industry, a shift in demand would move
price along the marginal supply price curve. In either case, the ratio
of price to marginal cost would change following a shift in demand
only if the elasticity of demand also changed.
2. If demand is kept constant and cost is permitted to change,
consideration of the elasticity of demand is again necessary. In the
case of the individual firm faced with a sloped demand curve, a
change in cost would be directly reflected in a proportional change
in price if the elasticity of demand at the new point of equilibrium
is the same as at the old. If with a movement along the demand
curve demand becomes less elastic, and the marginal-cost curve is
horizontal, an upward shift of the marginal-cost curve would result
in a more than proportional price rise, and a downward shift would
result in a less than proportional price fall. Any movement along
the demand curve which increases elasticity would of course operate
in the opposite direction.
Under competitive conditions, shifts in the marginal supply price
schedule would lead to equilibrium prices which lie on the demand
curve, and the equilibrium price would equal marginal supply price
at every point.
Thus, when the elasticity of demand for the individual firm re-
mains constant, and in all cases of pure competition, the equilib-
rium price will move directly proportionally with marginal cost.
Price and marginal cost will diverge only when the elasticity of de-
mand for the individual firm at the new point of equilibrium is
different from that at the old. When demand becomes less elastic,
a fall in marginal cost will not be matched by a proportional fall in
price, and a rise in marginal cost will lead to a price rise which is
more than proportional. The obverse would hold when demand
becomes more elastic.
This analysis throws some light on the question of the relative
price behavior of firms in monopoly and competition during eco-
nomic fluctuations. As Scitovsky has pointed out,32 the belief that
prices are more variable under competition than under monopoly
probably sprang from the fact that competitive producers tend to
undercut one another's price in response to flagging demand and
falling costs, while the monopolist in a similar Situation can keep
up his price. But, as Scitovsky says, the heart of the question is not
whether the monopolist can maintain prices which are less variable
12 Scitovsky. op. cit., p. 663.
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than those which would obtain under competitive conditions, but
whether it is really in his interest to do so. It has already been
noted that under pure competition if the marginal supply price
schedule is horizontal any change in factor costs would be directly
reflected in price. For the individual firm faced with a sloped de-
mand curve and a horizontal marginal-cost curve, price would not
equal marginal cost but would move exactly with it, if the elasticity
of demand did not change. The relevant question, therefore, is
whether in economic fluctuations a fall in demand would be asso-
ciated with an increase or a decrease in the elasticity of demand.
According to Harrod,84 a fall in demand will make people more
sensitive to price differences. In his view the imperfection of compe-
tition is due to habit, inertia, and lack of knowledge. The pressure
of poverty is necessary to drive people to the trouble of avoiding
waste; why, he asks, should a man in more comfortable circumstances
make as much effort to find the cheapest market? "With an expand-
ing income a man may slip by imperceptible stages into careless
habits. A contraction recalls him to his senses. He is loath to re-
linquish enjoyments to which he has been accustomed and immedi-
ately begins to cast about for means of meeting adversity with the
least inconvenience to himself. -.. Heseeks to economize with the
smallest possible loss in substantive utility."85 Thus Harrod argues
83 Tsiang, for example (op. cit., pp. 23.24) observes that under imperfect com-
petition the prices of individual products are more or less under the control of
the individual producers. From this he suggests that a rise in demand need not
imply a rise in market price, as is necessarily the case under perfect competition
where the demand confronting each producer is horizontal. In this connection
it should be noted, however, that if the elasticity of demand for the product
did not change and if marginal costs were constant over the relevant range of
output for the producer in imperfect competition, no change in price could be
expected to occur with a rise in demand—that is, the reaction in imperfect
competition would differ from the reaction in perfect competition only because
of the assumed difference in cost structure.
To the extent that producers do not maximize profits in the short run, prices
may move differently (more or less) from what would be expected on the basis
of changes in costs and demand. In perfect competition producers may refrain
from placing goods on the market or conversely may dump their stocks, thus
producing prices different from what would be expected on the basis of change
in current costs and demand. If producers in perfect competition feel that a
drop in demand is temporary, goods may be held off the market, and prices will
not drop as much as would have been expected in terms of the fall in demand
and marginal costs in the individual plants.
84 R. F. Harrod, "Imperfect Competition and the Trade Cycle," Review of
Economic Statistics, May 1936, pp. 84-88.
85 Ibid., p. 87.
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that demand will become more elastic in times of depression and
less elastic as prosperity returns.
The validity of Harrod's argument has been questioned a number
of times, and Gaibraith has gone so far as to state the opposite. He
says: "Where the decrease in demand is the result of depression an
increase in elasticity may be considered improbable. People with
decreased money incomes and increased concern for their economic
security are less rather than more responsive to lower prices. Pro.
ducers and consumers alike tend to postpone purchases of durable
equipment."°
Of the two arguments, Harrod's seems the more persuasive. Gal-
braith has not given any reason why people who have increased con-
cern for their economic security feel that they can afford to neglect
price considerations. The fact that producers and consumers tend
to postpone their purchases of durables has more to do with the
level of demand than with its elasticity.
Whether or not Harrod is correct as a general rule, however, it is
obvious that for different goods the elasticity of demand will be
affected differently by economic fluctuations. A situation which in-
creases people's price sensitivity between bread and potatoes may
make the demand curve for train rides from New Haven to New
York more inelastic by taking away from it a large portion of the
rather elastic demand of those who travel for pleasure and leaving
as the major element the rather inelastic demand of those who travel
on business. Without much more knowledge of a great many more
variables, it does not seem likely that the change in elasticity of de-
mand to be expected in any particular instance can be predicted. It
does not follow, therefore, that a monopoly would always have less
variable prices during periods of economic fluctuation than would
a purely competitive industry. Indeed, to the extent that Harrod's
arguments are valid, in order to maximize profits the monopolist
should have the more variable prices.
It is apparent from the discussion above that the determination
of changes in elasticity for any individual producer might be very
difficult(if not impossible). If change in the elasticity of demand
is included as one of the factors determining the expected change in
price, therefore, it would be impossible to compute the expected
price behavior. Furthermore, under certain forms of industrial or-
ganization the change in the elasticity of demand is one of the key
36J.K.Gaibraith, 'Monopoly Power and Price Rigidities," Quarterly Journal
of Economics, May ig6, p. 463.
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factors determining the expected reaction of price to a change in
cost. In assessing the flexibility of prices associated with various
types of industrial organization, it is important not to include in
the measure of expected prices elements which are implicitly cor-
related with a specific form of industrial organization, and the effect
of a change in the elasticity of demand is just such an element.
Under perfect competition, changes in the elasticity of demand for
various products will not affect the expected price; it will remain
equal to marginal cost. For the individual firm faced with a sloped
demand curve, however, any shift in the elasticity of demasid will
cause the expected price to rise or fall faster or slower than marginal
cost. The inclusion of changes in elasticity as one of the factors de-
termining the expected change in price will therefore obscure the
influence of industrial organization on price behavior.
For these reasons, the definition of price flexibility given above
(page 458) will be modified so as to relegate changes in the elasticity
of demand to the same category as changes in expectations, etc.,
discussed above on page 47. The expected change in price will be
determined on the basis of the change in marginal cost only; a
change in the elasticity of demand, like a change in expectations,
will (if profits are maximized) result in what will be defined as price
inflexibility. Perfect price flexibility will then be a situation in
which price changes by the same percentage as marginal cost. If
price moves less than marginal cost, the price is inflexible;ifit
moves more than marginal cost, it is excessively flexible; and if it
moves in the opposite direction from marginal cost it is inversely
flexible.87
Thus far, the discussion of price behavior has been couched en-
tirely in terms of perfect and monopolistic competition, and the
more complex area of oligopoly has not been considered. In an
oligopolistic market, it would not necessarily be true that if profits
are to be maximized the prices charged for a product will change in
response to changes in the elasticity of demand and changes in
marginal cost; that kinked demand curves can lead to price inflexi-
bility has often been pointed out.88 However, the determination of
8 This definition corresponds to that implicit in Lerners measure of the
degree o( monopoly, which both Dunlop arid Tsiang used. Constancy in the
percentage margin between price and marginal cost would indicate that prices
and marginal costs moved by the same percentage.
88 For a discussion of the possible role of the kinked demand curve and other
oligopoliscic influences, see George J. Stigler, 'The Kinky Oligopoly Curve and
Rigid Prices," Journal of Political Economy, October '947, pp. 432-449. and
Sho-Chieh Tsiang, op. cit., pp. 69-74.
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the effect of the exact conditions and assumptions under which an
oligopolist is operating is not unlike the problem of change in the
elasticity of demand in monopolistic competition. In the first place,
the actual assumptions made by the different firms in an oligopolistic
industry cannot be derived empirically, so that it is virtually im-
possible to establish any norm for expected price behavior in these
instances. Furthermore, the very difference in behavior between
firms in oligopoly and firms in perfect competition is an element
which it would be interesting to measure. With the definition of
price flexibility suggested above, the effects of oligopolistic condi-
tions would tend to appear as price inflexibility, so that the im-
portance of such an industrial organization in this respect could
be assessed.
The following section will apply this definition of price flexibility
to the various sectors of the economy. The statistics are purely illus-
trative. No attempt has been made to carry out a comprehensive
empirical survey; such a study would absorb considerable resources
and would involve extensive detailed analyses. Partwill only show
what general indications do exist with respect to the empirical facts
of price flexibility, and suggest the directions in which further work
might proceed.
S. Cost, Price, and Output Behavior of Various Sectors
of the American Economy, 1929-1932
THEdepression of the thirties affords an opportunity for studying
the reaction of different industrial sectors of the economy to a sharp
and deep contraction in the level of income and demand. It is essen-
tial to confine this sort of analysis to short periods of time, in order
to minimize the influence of such secular factors as technology, in.
stitutional change, and the growth and decline of industries. For
this reason the empirical analysis in this section will generally be
restricted to the period 1929to1932. For some sectors (agriculture
and distributive trades) data for a few years after 1932 will be pre-
sented in order to throw some light on the relation of cycle to trend.
For manufacturing, only 1929and1931willbe considered, since the
basic source of data is the Biennial Census of Manufactures.
In the following presentation the flow of goods will be followed
through the different stages of the production process, and in each
stage the relationship among the changes in costs, prices, and output
will be examined. The production of agricultural goods will be
considered first, and then that part of manufacturing which is con-
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cerned with the processing or fabrication of agricultural materials.
A few of the major mineral products will then be examined, and
from this the analysis will proceed to the manufacturing industries
which utilize mineral products. Finally, finished goods will be fol-
lowed through the distributive channels to the consumer. The exact
form of the discussion will differ among sectors, depending on both
the special problems arising in the particular sector and the nature
of the available statistical material.
AGRICULTURE: FIELD CROPS
IN AGRICULTURE, any analysis of output and prices must take into
account the special role played by variations in harvests. The effect
of over-all economic fluctuations is overlaid on a pattern of good
and bad harvests, so that an analysis of the effect of a fall in de-
mand on price and output must take account of variations in crop
size due solely to weather. No simple correction can be made to
eliminate the influence of weather and predict what would have
occurred under "normal" conditions. Even for years which can be
considered "normal," the effect of previous abnormal years will be
reflected in the level of stocks, and this in turn will influence prices.
Rather than attempt a correction of agricultural price and output
data, therefore, an indirect approach will be utilized. From an
examination of the nature of cost conditions for various products,
the reactions of farmers to economic fluctuations in terms of altered
inputs will be predicted. Data on agricultural inputs will then be
consulted to see how far the actual statistics agree with what would
be expected.
In crop production, farmers generally provide much of the neces-
sary labor themselves and receive as compensation the residual after
other costs are paid. Hired labor is relatively unimportant; in 1929
it amounted to only 8.5 per cent of the gross cash income from
marketings. The farmer attempts to maximize his residual share,
so that from the point of view of cost-output determination his own
labor return becomes part of overhead, like his other fixed costs and
the return on his capital. Marginal costs for the individual producer
of agricultural crops involve primarily such things as seed, fertilizer,
gasoline, twine, sacks, and small amounts of hired labor. Data for
89 Material Bearing on Parity Prices, Dept. of Agriculture, 1941. p.9, and
Income Parity for Agriculture, Dept. of Agriculture, '939, Part ii,Sectioni,
p.5.
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the year 1938° indicate that for most agricultural crops marginal
costs would not be more than 15to20 per Cent of total costs. Of
course when the farmer reaches capacity, in the sense that all the
land available to him is in full use, the marginal-cost curve will rise
sharply, becoming discontinuous at this point. In the production of
crops, therefore, the marginal-cost curve will be very low at points
below full cultivation and will become vertical at the point of full
cultivation. The farmer does produce at the point where marginal
cost equals price: the vertically rising marginal-cost curve at full
capacity will cut the horizontal demand curve at that point, so that
it pays the farmer to produce as much as he can. With a fall in de-
mand, the demand curve for the individual farmer will move down-
ward, but it will still be horizontal, and unless demand should fall
far enough so that price would be below the farmer's minimum
marginal cost, it will still be in his interest to maintain capacity
production. Even if the prices to the farmer of the elements going
into marginal cost should change, the vertical portion of the mar-
ginal-cost curve will remain the same, so that regardless of changes
in cost and demand the farmer will generally find it to his profit to
cultivate his land fully.
Not only will the individual farmer maintain his output, but, in
the face of a general fall in income and demand, marginal farmers
will not leave the industry. Those marginal farmers who would if
demand falls receive an inadequate residual return for their labor
and fixed costs, should under normal conditions be attracted away
from agriculture by superior opportunities elsewhere. But when
there is a general fall in income and demand in the economy there
are no employment opportunities elsewhere, and the farmer finds
that he has little or no possibility of getting out of agriculture.
It seems reasonable to expect, therefore, that the number of acres
harvested by farmers should not decline in the depression. Statistics
on the total number of acres harvested by farmers and the acres of
various crops harvested are given in Table 1.
Thetotal quantity of crops harvested did not change appreciably
in the sharp decline of income and demand from 1929 to 1932. Gov-
ernmental restriction of production shows up in the year 1934. The
statistics for individual crops show considerable variation, but it
would be difficult to tell without further detailed analysis whether
the variations are in fact due to changes in income and demand.
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Some of the changes, such as the decline in cotton, are probably due
to secular influences. Insofar as other crops are substituted for cot-
ton, they too will show a secular influence. Furthermore, to the
extent that farmers do react to differential price changes due to
different weather conditions in various regions, the actual analysis
becomes very complex. But it seems clear that the depression di-
rectly following 1929 did not cause farmers as a group to contract
the total number of acres harvested.
As noted above, differences in the year-to-year yield of the various
crops make it almost impossible to analyze the impact of changes in
demand on price changes of agricultural goods. Nevertheless, an
examination of the price indexes for the crops whose acreage is
given in Table 1 can illustrate the general magnitude of the impact
which the depression had upon these prices. These price indexes
are shown in Table 2. It can be seen from this table that a price
drop of 6o per cent was not unusual—the smallest price drop for
any crop was 30 per cent, and even this was large compared with
the acreage changes shown in Table i.
AGRICULTURE: LIVESTOCK PRODUCTION
FARMERS who are primarily engaged in raising livestock may face a
cost situation somewhat different from that described for the pro-
ducers of field crops. To the extent that cattle are grazed on grass-
lands or the farmer grows his own feed, marginal cost still may be
small relative to total value of product until full capacity is reached,
becoming discontinuous at that point. However, if the farmer pur-
chases his feed, marginal cost may be high relative to total value of
product at all levels of output. The individual producer cannot
afford to stay in business if the price of his output falls below his
marginal costs, so that it might seem that price could not fall very
far without causing a contraction in output. But according to the
analysis of field crops presented above, the quantity of feed grown
does not contract in depressions. The demand for feed is entirely
derived from the demand for livestock, so that the price of feed will
fall proportionally to the price of livestock. Any contraction in live-
stock production would immediately leave surplus feed which would
drive the price of feed down until it would all be taken. Thus, tak-
ing into account the effects on the price of feed, the volume of live-
stock production would not be expected to contract in a depression,





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.PRICE FLEXIBILITY AND CHANGES
stock, or perhaps even between some field crops and livestock. Table
gives the production of various kinds of livestock; from these
figures it does not appear that the fluctuations in production in the
period 1929-1932 were any more significant in magnitude than they
were in other parts of the 1929-1939 period.
Agriculture, then, because of the nature of its marginal costs,
would be expected to maintain its output in the face of a fall in
demand, and this expected behavior is in fact borne out by the sta-
tistics on crops and livestock. The whole impact of a contraction in
demand falls on price; price will decline until the full quantity
produced can be absorbed by the economy.
MANUFACTURING: AGRICULTURAL RAW MATERIALS
MANUFACTURING plants that process agricultural raw materials are
of course related to agriculture, but the nature of the relationship
between price and marginal cost is quite different. In order to ex-
amine whether the price behavior of agricultural processing plants
corresponds to what would be expected on the basis of changes in
their marginal costs, it will be necessary to give attention to (1) the
nature and shape of their cost functions,(2) the price changes in
the elements of cost, and ()thechanges in their output prices.
I. Exact determination of the shape of the marginal-cost curve is
not feasible for each individual industry. No reliable methods are
at present available for measuring the shape of marginal-cost curves
from empirical data. However, another attack on the problem
is possible. By making a simple arbitrary assumption about the
nature of marginal cost, the process as a whole can be made opera-
tional, and any results which are derived can then be reconsidered
in terms of possible alternative assumptions about the shape of
marginal costs. For the purpose of the preliminary analysis, there-
fore, it will be assumed that marginal cost was constant over the
relevant range of output, and that in the periods studied the tech-
nical coefficients of the input factors were also fairly constant. In
this connection user cost of plant and equipment will be neglected,
both because it is impossible to measure and because its influence
on marginal costs is probably very minor. These assumptions imply
that within relevant production ranges each additional unit of out-
put would require a specific fixed amount of labor and materials
41HansStaehle, "The Measurement of Statistical Cost Functions: An Appraisal





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.PRICE FLEXIBILITY AND CHANGES
irrespective of the output level, and the relative changes in the
prices of capital, labor, and materials would not in the short run
cause significant substitutions among the input elements. At the end
of the analysis, these assumptions will be reviewed by considering
what effect other kinds of assumptions would have on the analysis.
2. With an assumed constancy of marginal cost and fixed rela-
tions among the input factors of labor and materials for incremental
changes in output, it is possible to construct a price index of the
change in marginal cost from available empirical materials, as fol-
lows. Under the given assumptions, labor and materials costs would
have approximately the same relative importance in both marginal
costs and average direct costs.42 Therefore, if the price change in
labor cost per unit and the price change in materials cost per unit
were combined according to their relative importance in direct
costs, an approximation of the price change in marginal cost should
be obtained.48.Thechanges in output prices can best be computed from the
same body of statistical data that was used to derive direct costs. It
is more meaningful to consider value per unit of output than quoted
prices. Such factors as shifts in the composition of output, the im-
portance of discounts, and the existence of special prices for some
customers will affect total receipts and so will be reflected in value
per unit of output, whereas they might well be omitted in an analy-
sis of quoted prices. In the census statistics, furthermore, the value
of product which is recorded for an industry is from the same set of
plant questionnaires that furnish the data on cost of materials and
42 In the following discussion the term "direct costs" will be used to denote
the census classifications of (i) wages paid to direct labor, plus (a) cost of ma-
terials used. Changes in average direct costs can be obtained by dividing the
total change by an index of output change. It is assumed that these direct costs
do not contain any overhead labor or materials costs. In Tsiang's terminology,
these direct costs are referred to as prime costs.
43 This procedure is somewhat similar to Dunlop's calculation of the price
changes in marginal cost by using census weights for combining price indexes of
wages and raw materials. The main difference between the two approaches is
that instead of utilizing Dunlop's indexes for wage rates and raw materials, the
present calculation derives average labor cost per unit and average materials cost
per unit from the census statistics. In contrast with Dunlop's assumptions, it is
interesting to note that Neal and Tsiang make the assumption that average direct
cost is equal to marginal cost, and thus use the census statistics directly for
computing the change in marginal cost. The actual statistical result achieved
by this process isidentical with the other method. However, it should be
pointed out that their assumption that average direct cost equals marginal cost
is overly restrictive, since for the process to be legitimate itis only necessary
that the change in average direct cost be equal to the change in marginal cost.
472PRICE FLEXIBILITY AND CHANGES
wages paid. The use of a matched set of data makes more reasonable
the assumption that the same industrial classifications, the same time
period, and the same concepts of output were used in obtaining both
costs and receipts. It was on this basis that the data in the Census of
Manufactures were used to obtain approximations of the changes
which took place in marginal cost, price, and output for various in-
dustries in the period 1929-1931.
Tableshows the percentage changes in labor cost per unit,
materials cost per unit, direct cost per unit, value per unit, and out-
TABLE 4
Percentage Change in Unit Costs and in Output, Various Agricultural
Processing Industries, 1929-1931
LaborMaterialsDirect
Industsy Cost Cost Cost ValueOutput
(per unit)
Flour —15 —42 —41 —38 —9
Meat packing —14 —35—— —5
Butter —25 —39 —39 —39 +2
Cane-sugar refining o —12 —11 —so —13
Cotton goods —13 —42 —32 —34 —22
Woolen and worsted goods —12 —32 —27 —26 —19
Women's clothing —24 —25 —25 —26 +3
Textile gloves —i6 —i —27 —27 —33
Cloth hats —iS —20 —19 —21 —40
Leather —3 —37 —32 —30 —19
Leather boots and shoes _13 —22 —20 —20 —16
Source: Cost and value data, Biennial Census of Manufactures: 1933,Bureau
of the Census, pp. 42-44, 133-135, 380; output data, Solomon Fabricant, The Out-
put of Manufacturing Industries, 1899.1937(NationalBureau of Economic Re-
search, 1940), pp. 385, 387, 395, 404, 427, 430, 436, 437, 457, 462, 474.
put for a number of manufacturing industries which process agri-
cultural goods. Labor cost in this table relates to production workers
only. The wage and salary payments made to administrative, sales,
technical, office, and supervisory personnel (with the exception of
working foremen and gang bosses) are all excluded. The output
data given in Tablehave been taken from Solomon Fabricant.44
They may not be fully satisfactory for many industries; to the ex-
tent that the quality of a product changes while the unit in which
output is measured does not change, the real output rate may be
obscured. Fortunately, it is not crucial that the output indexes be
truly valid. The major point of the analysis is to examine the rela-
4SolomonFabricant, The Output of Manufacturing Industries, 1899-1937
(NationalBureau of Economic Research, 1940), Appendix B.
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tive changes in labor cost, materials cost, and value per unit within
each industry; the output index is used only to reduce the total
figures to averages. The relationship among labor cost, materials
cost, and value per unit will be the same regardless of the output
index, since for any one industry the total figures are all divided by
the same constant. The only reason for using an output index at all
was to get some idea of similarities and differences among the dif-
ferent industries. Only if the output indexes possess a relatively high
degree of validity will these interindustry comparisons be meaning-
ful, and in any case very little accent should be placed on small
differences among industries.
The industries shown in Table 4 were chosen because they involve
the use of a number of different agricultural products, and also be-
cause they illustrate a number of different analytic points. The most
outstanding findings which emerge from the table as a whole are
that labor cost dropped less than materials cost in all instances, and
that together these direct costs dropped by about the same per-
centage as price. Thus if the change in direct costs is taken to be an
approximation of the change in marginal cost, price in the indus-
tries shown moved directly with marginal cost.
A more detailed examination of Table 4 brings out some addi.
tional points of interest. There is considerable variation among the
industries in the extent of the drop in labor costs, and no simple
explanation of the causes of such variation is apparent. Differential
changes in wage rates or in the wage structure might account for
some of the variation, but probably of equal importance are the
differences in productivity changes among industries, the substitu-
tion of the owner's labor for hired labor in small firms (for exam-
ple, the butter industry), the differential rate of contraction of firms
having high labor costs compared with firms having lower labor
costs, and finally the doubtful validity of the output index as an
indicator of real output changes.
The variations among the industries in the changes in materials
cost are somewhat more easily explained. The drop in materials cost
is greatest for those industries that directly consume unprocessed
farm products, and is less for those industries that utilize partly
processed agricultural products. Thus, the drop in materials cost
was substantial for flour, meat packing, butter, cotton goods, and
leather, and somewhat less for women's clothing, textile gloves, cloth
hats, and boots and shoes. The woolen and worsted industry is hard
to classify because it is composed of a number of different sub-
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industries, some of which supply various intermediate products to
later processing stages, and so represents a mixture of plants at
various stages of processing. Cane.sugar refining has been included
to illustrate what happens in an agricultural processing industry
when materials prices are less variable. Most cane sugar for refining
is imported, and since this import price did not drop as much as the
prices of other agricultural materials the price of refined sugar did
not drop as much as the prices of the other processed agricultural
goods shown.
A separate examination of the drop in labor costs and the drop
in materials costs is not sufficient to account for all the variations in
final goods prices in the various industries. The relative importance
of labor and materials in the production process must be taken into
account, in order to give an accurate appraisal of the change in di.
rect costs. The significance of this point is well illustrated by a com-
parison of the butter and the cotton industries. The percentage drop
in labor costs for the butter industry (25 per cent) was considerably
greater than it was for the cotton industry (i per cent). The drop
in materials costs was about the same for the two industries (butter,
39 per cent; cotton, 42 per cent). Because of the greater importance
of labor in the cotton industry, the output price of cotton goods
dropped somewhat less (percent) than it did for butter (jper
cent). Materials were so much more important than labor in the
butter industry that the output price of butter changed by exactly
the same percentage as did materials.
Finally, there are significant differences in the degree to which
prices (value per unit) dropped in the various industries shown in
Tablethese differences can all be explained adequately in terms
of (i) the changes in labor costs and materials costs and (2) the
relative importance of labor and materials in the production process.
The higher the degree of fabrication, the more important labor be-
comes in relation to materials and the more closely will price change
follow the change in labor cost. The prices at which processed agri-
cultural goods are sold to distributors, therefore, will depend in
large part on how highly they are fabricated before they are ready
for the consumer. The variations in relative price changes even
within the agricultural processing industries are not inconsiderable.
Excluding cane-sugar refining, the drop in finished-goods prices in
Table 4 ranges from 20 per cent for boots and shoes to 39 per cent
for butter. But, insofar as output prices shown in Table 4 do tend
to move with cost, they can all be called flexible, despite the fact
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that the amplitude of change differs considerably from industry to
industry.
As noted above, the use of the change in direct cost per unit as
an indicator of the change in marginal cost involves the assumptions
of constant marginal costs and a lack of substitution among capital,
labor, and materials in the period under study. It will be useful at
this juncture, therefore, to examine the effects of different assump-
tions about marginal cost upon the analysis.
If the marginal-cost curve, instead of being constant, were up-
ward sloping (i.e. marginal cost increasing with increases in output)
the drop in direct costs shown in Table 4 would be an understate-
ment of the actual drop in marginal costs. Under such circumstances,
instead of the roughly equivalent movement of marginal costs and
prices indicated in Table 4 by the change in direct costs and prices,
marginal cost would in fact generally have fallen more than prices,
so that according to the definition of price flexibility adopted above
prices would be somewhat inflexible. Conversely, if marginal costs
were downward sloping (i.e. marginal costs decreasing with increas-
ing output) the fall in direct costs shown in Table 4 would overstate
the actual drop in marginal costs, and prices would be overly flexible.
In assessing the suitability of the assumptions made earlier with
respect to the probable shape of the marginal-cost curves for the
industries shown in Table 4, the following points should be borne
in mind. For a good many industries, it does not seem reasonable to
expect that the amount of materials required per unit of output
should vary in any manner except directly with output—especially,
for example, in such industries as flour, butter, and cane-sugar re-
fining. In these industries, too, labor costs are not a very large pro-
portion of direct costs, so that any variation in the amount of direct
labor required per unit of output as output increases would have
relatively little influence on the level of marginal cost. And in cer-
tain other industries, it may be true, as Reynolds has suggested for
cotton textiles, that the fixed factors which are usually assumed to
be indivisible are in fact highly divisible. Many plants are made up
of batteries of similar machines, each of which can be operated as an
independent unit. If the machines are of equal efficiency, the put-
ting into use of successive units need not involve any increase or
decrease in marginal cost. Finally, shifts in the marginal-cost func-
45LloydG. Reynolds, "Relations Between Wage Rates, Costs, and Prices,"
American Economic Review, March Supplement, 1942,pp.275-301,esp.p. 277.
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tion due to technological changes are somewhat less likely to have
taken place in the downswing period under consideration (1929-
1931) than in other periods. All things considered, an attempt to
arrive at more realistic assumptions about the shape of the marginal-
cost function (and technological change) in many of the agricul-
tural processing industries would probably result in refinements
which would be matters of detail rather than of consequence. This
would not be true in every case, but it would be true in the ma-
jority of cases.
MINING
THE minerals industries present yet a different set of problems. Un.
fortunately, in this sector any analysis is seriously hampered by the
lack of adequate data. The various types of mining, furthermore,
cannot be treated as one homogeneous group in the way agricultural
crop production was. Each particular branch of the mineral indus-
try has its own peculiarities.
In coal mining, labor cost is even more important than it is in
most manufacturing industries. For the year 1929, labor costs repre-
sented about 6o per cent of the value of the product in both the
anthracite and bituminous industries.46 Materials costs amount to
about 15percent of the value of the product. It is difficult to find
data showing how materials costs changed from 1929 to 1932 or
what materials were used, but very probably few if any direct
products of agriculture were involved. To the extent that materials
used were highly processed goods, their costs should change in about
the same way as labor costs. And in any case, since labor costs con-
stitute 8o per cent of the total direct cost in coal mining, a rela-
tively small error would be introduced by assuming that total direct
costs moved about the same way as labor costs. The data in Table 5
have been drawn up on this assumption. This table shows that
prices and labor costs did move together for the period 1929-1932,
a period in which production of coal was cut back sharply.
The data on iron-ore production are difficult to interpret because
of the vertical integration of the industry. Quoted prices of iron ore
did not change at all throughout the depression, but even though
these unchanging prices did nominally appear on the books of
vertically integrated firms, their significance may be questioned. The
separation of the accounts of the operation of iron-ore mining from
46Abstiact of the Fifteenth Census of the United States, Bureau of the Census,
1933,p. 583.
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the production of steel within the same firm is of necessity an arbi-
trary procedure, and the resulting statistics represent imputations
which are irrelevant from the point of view of the total profits of
the firm.
TABLE 5
Indexes of Labor Cost and Value per Unit in the Extractive Industries,
1929-1952
(1q29 =100)
Industry 1930 1931 1932
Anthracitecoal:
Labor cost per unit 'os 95 82
Value per unit g8 q5 84
Output 94 8i 68
Bituminous coal:
Labor cost per unit 95 86 71
Valueper unit 95 87 72
Output 87 71 58
Crude petroleum:
Labor cost per unit 97 75 56
Value per unit q 5z 68
Output 89 84 78
Metalliferous mining:
Labor COSt per Unit 104 90 84
Value per unit 90 78 75
Output 75 50 26
Source: Statistical A bstract of the United States, 1939,Dept.of Commerce, p.
34o; Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1940,Dept.of Commerce, pp. 784,
791,804.
The production of petroleum and nonferrous metals differs from
coal production in that the differing richness of deposits is a very
important factor. No generalization can be made about cost curves
in either industry. Some oil wells or mines utilize low-grade deposits
and have relatively high marginal costs in the form of labor and
some materials. Other wells or mines are much richer, having very
low marginal costs and yielding considerable rent. With a fall in de-
mand, high-cost producers will be forced to abandon operations com-
pletely, while the low-cost producers can continue to operate. This
situation is well illustrated by the Michigan copper-mining industry.
In 1929, the yield of copper per ton of ore was 24.5 pounds; in 1930,
25.4 pounds; in 1931,33.1pounds; and finally in 1932, 47.6 pounds.47
Similarly, output per man-hour in the production of crude pe-
41MineralResources of the United States, 5931,GeologicalSurvey, '9M' Part
1, p.246; and Minerals Yearbook, 5932-33,Bureauof Mines, p. 146.
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troleum was 35 per cent48 greater in 1932 than it was in 1929, and
in lead and zinc mining it was 68 per cent greater.49 High-yield
deposits thus account for a relatively larger share of the total out-
put of the industry when demand falls. The cost curves of a high-
yield producer are very much like those of a farmer. Marginal costs
are relatively low, becoming discontinuous (i.e. vertical) at capacity
production. With a fall in demand, a high-yield mine, in order to
maximize present income, should continue full production; although
price has fallen, price would still be equal to marginal cost.1° In
considering how price should move relative to direct cost actually
incurred with a fall in demand, however, one would expect price
to come closer to direct cost, since direct cost actually incurred lies
on the portion of the curve just before the vertical rise. Thus, the
fall in price would tend to be greater than that in actual direct
cost. Exact prediction of the movement of price relative to direct
cost would require engineering knowledge of the difference in the
richness of deposits in the industry and economic knowledge of the
structure of the industry. The data for petroleum and metalliferous
mining in Table 5 show that, as would be expected in these in-
dustries, if the change in labor cost is again taken as an index of
the change in direct costs prices fell faster than direct costs.
It will be apparent that this discussion of the mineral industries
has in fact been concerned with the shape of the supply curves in
the various industries. For coal mining and probably also for quarry-
ing, the abundance of deposits of roughly similar productivity leads
to supply curves for these products that are almost horizontal for a
wide range below capacity production. If costs do not change, a fall
in demand would probably result in a fall in output rather than in
price. It is only if the supply curve shifts downward due to falling
labor costs that any significant price decline can take place. In con-
trast, those minerals which are found in deposits of widely varying
richness will have rising industry supply curves, and a fall in de-
mand will intersect the supply curve at a lower point, thus permit-
48 Production, Employment, and Productivity in the Mineral Extractive In-
dustries, 1880-1938, National Research Project, Works Project Administration,
p. 63.
49 Employment and Output per Man in the Mineral Extractive Industries, Na-
tional Research Project, Works Project Administration, 1940, Report S-a, p. 74.
50 In some cases the owner of a very valuable natural resource might prefer
shutting down operations long before price fell to the point where it equalled
direct operating costs. Since minerals are exhaustible resources, mining involves
a cost akin to user cost, and if the mine is very rich and the producer has high
future expectations this user cost might be great.
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ting a price fall as well as a contraction in output. Any downward
shift in costs, of course, would increase the price drop and permit
a larger output than would otherwise be possible.
MANUFACTURING: MINERAL RAW MATERIALS
THE processing of mineral materials by manufacturing industries
can be examined in a manner similar to that used for the processing
of agricultural materials. Table 6 presents the relevant data for a
TABLE 6
Percentage Change in Unit Costs and in Output, Various Mineral Processing
Industries, 1929-1931
LaborMaterialsDirect
Industry Cost Cost Cost ValueOut pitt
(per unit)
Lime —i8 —17 —iS —20 —22
Clay products —14 —7 —11 —11 —52
Petroleum refining —io —34 —33 —36 —g
Fertilizer —'3 —5 —14 —15 —22
Tincans —20 —i6 —17 —i8 —8
Wire drawn from
purchased rods — —29 —24 —24 —49
Nonferrous metal products —20 —45 —41 —38 —41
Washingmachines —24 —24 —24 —22 —21
Buttons —14 —18 —i6 _17 —12
Pens —i —24 —17 —i6 —17
Clocksand watches —4 —5 —5 —.3 —26
Manufactured heating and
illuminating gas —12 —12 —12 —1 —8
Source: Cost and value data, Biennial Census of Manufactures: 1933,Bureauof
the Census, pp. 308, 358, 397, 427,428,491,492,523, 631, 632; output data,
Solomon Fabricant, The Output of Manufacturing Industries, 1899-1937(Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research, 1940),pp.497, 517,531,522, 552, 553, 556,
559, 578, 593, 596.
number of different industry groups. Like the agricultural processing
industries, the mineral processing industries in Table 6 show a cor-
respondence between direct costs and prices, with one significant ex-
ception. This exception is manufactured heating and illuminating
gas; in this industry direct costs dropped 12 per cent while price
dropped onlyper cent. The reason for this discrepancy is obvious:
gas is a public utility and its rates are fixed. It has been included in
the selection of industries in Table 6 to show how an inflexibility of
prices relative to costs would show up, even in a case where costs
were not particularly flexible.
The mineral processing industries are very different from the ag-
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ricultural processing industries with respect to the magnitude and
consistency of the drop in materials cost. For the agricultural proc-
essing industries it was noted that materials costs dropped con-
siderably, and in all cases more than labor cost. In contrast, the ma-
terials costs for lime, clay products, fertilizer, tin cans, buttons, clocks
and watches, and manufactured gas dropped less than for any agri-
cultural processing industry, and in some of these cases fell less than
did labor costs. The industries which exhibit this smaller drop in
materials costs are either those which obtain a significant portion
of their materials from those extractive industries in which the price
drop would be expected to be small, or else those which use more
highly fabricated materials, which already have a considerable
amount of labor cost in them. Petroleum refining and nonferrous
metal products behave differently from the industries just listed,
in that their material costs do drop significantly. Again this is what
would be expected, because of the nature of the mineral industries
supplying them. The remaining industries require further explana-
tion. Wire drawn from purchased rods uses both steel and copper.
The drop in materials cost for the wire industry, therefore, should
fall somewhere between those of these two raw materials. If the fall
in materials cost for tin cans and the fall in price of nonferrous
metal products are taken as indicators for steel and copper respec-
tively (since nothing better is available), materials cost in the wire
industry does behave as expected. For washing machines, labor cost
declines more than it does for any other industry in Table 6, which
is hardly to be expected. The explanation here may lie in the lack
of validity of a production index which does not take into account
a change in the quality of the product. If cheaper washing machines
were produced in 1931,thereal output would have fallen more
than indicated by the production index, and the declines in both
labor cost and materials cost would have been smaller than appear
here.
The conclusion that is reached from an examination of these
mineral processing industries, then, is in accord with that reached
for agricultural processing industries. The prices of producers tend
to move in accordance with their direct costs, computed as the
weighted average of labor and materials costs. In some of the mineral
processing industries, a fall in demand does not produce a sharp de-
cline in materials cost; instead the decline in materials cost is about
equal to the decline in labor cost so that price, materials cost, and
labor cost all move together. In those cases where materials cost does
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decline sharply, the reaction will be like that in the agricultural proc-
essing industries. The higher the degree of fabrication the more
closely the change in the price of the product will approach the
change in labor cost, since labor cost is relatively a more important
part of the total value of the product.
Again, it should be noted that the use of the change in direct cost
as an indicator of marginal cost in this analysis implies all the re-
strictive assumptions that were discussed above with reference to the
agricultural processing industries. It is quite possible that a number
of the industries listed in Table 6 did not have constant marginal
costs and fixed technical coefficients among their inputs in this pe-
riod. If the quantitative importance of these deviations was not
overly great, however, the changes in direct costs may still reflect
the approximate change in marginal costs. In some instances, it may
even be true that some of the discrepancies shown in Table 6 would
disappear if a better approximation to the change in marginal costs
could be obtained. Thus, for instance, if the marginal-cost function
in nonferrous metal products actually declined with expanding out-
put, the drop in direct cost shown in Table 6 would overstate the
actual drop in marginal cost, so that marginal cost and price might
have moved more closely together than did direct cost and price.
MANUFACTURING: SUMMARY
U TO this point in the analysis, specific industries in manufacturing
have been discussed to illustrate particular points, but there has been
no discussion of how well manufacturing as a whole fits this pattern.
It would not be meaningful to combine all of manufacturing, for
reasons which have already been pointed out. The aggregation of
agricultural processing industries with mineral processing indus-
tries, and materials-producing industries with those making highly
fabricated goods, would, because of the relative shifts in the im-
portance of these various groups, obscure the very relationships
which were being investigated. Some disaggregation is therefore nec-
essary. To cover all of manufacturing, and yet preserve to some ex-
tent the differences among the different major industries, the i6
major industry groups used in the census classification are presented
in Table 7. For three of the industry groups, production indexes are
not available.
Generally speaking, the correspondence between the drop in direct
costs and the drop in prices for the various industries is quite close.
In 7 of the i6 industries, the drop in price was within one per-
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centage point of the drop in direct cost. In 5 industries prices
dropped more than direct costs, and in 4 industries less. The 2
industries in which the discrepancy was greatest were chemicals and
rubber; in both of these price would have been expected to fall more
than it did. In forest products, iron and steel, and nonferrous metal
products, price dropped somewhat more than would have been ex-
pected. There does not seem to be any single simple explanation
that can account for these divergences.
TABLE 7
Food and kindred products—ii
Textiles and their products—i8
Forest products —13
Paper and allied products —14
Printing, publishing, and
allied industries +1




Leather and its manufactures —12
Stone, clay, and glass products —13
Iron and steel and their
products











—10 —6 —6 —i6
—23 —21 _15 —15
—27 —25 —25 —17
—37 —33 —21 —31
—28 —24 —25 —i8
—10 —11 —11 —34
























INDUSTRIES WIThNO OUTPUT INDEXES
Total Total Total
LaborMaterialsDirect Total
Cost Cost Cost Value
—48 —44 —46 —48
—68 —54 —62
—6i —63 —62 —68
Source: Cost and value data, Biennial Census of Manufactures: 1933,Bureau
of the Census, pp. 42, 133, 218, 262, a8o, 358, 372, 8o, 397, 426, 491, 522, 593,
6i8, 630; Output data, Solomon Fabricant, The Output of Manufacturing In-
dustries, 1899.1937(NationalBureau of Economic Research, 1940), pp. 410, 460,
475, 481, 485, 486, 514, 519, 535, 543, 556, 565, 592.
Aggregation like that of Table 7 has both advantages and dis-
advantages in drawing conclusions regarding the behavior patterns
of individual firms. Since many firms are included in the aggregate,
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the effect of normal random variance is reduced, and the average
change for the group as a whole takes on more significance. On the
other hand, aggregation combines what are essentially unhomogene-
ous groups. Any single industry includes a variety of products, and
some of these products will have wider margins between direct cost
and price than others (margin in this sense equals price minus
direct cost divided by price). If with a fall in demand the rates of
contraction of high-margin and low-margin products are different,
the aggregate would show a change in the average margin even if
the margin for every individual product remained unchanged. The
use of finer industry classifications in Tables 4 and 6 was in part an
attempt to avoid some of these aggregation problems. Even with a
single homogeneous industry, however, the aggregation problem
would not be entirely overcome. Margins in large firms may differ
from those in small firms, and the rate of contraction of firms in a
depression may be related to size. Or, margins for plants in one part
of the country may be different from margins in another part, and
the contraction in output may be more severe in one section of the
country than in others. For an accurate appraisal of the behavior of
the relation between direct costs and prices, it would in fact be nec-
essary to make the analysis product by product and plant by plant
throughout the country. Examination of a few representative indi-
vidual plants, furthermore, would not be sufficient; every plant has
special conditions, and there is ample evidence that the change in
margins from year to year is highly variable in individual cases.
What would be required would be distribution curves of margins
for all the plants and products in a given industry. Preliminary in-
vestigation along these lines has indicated that, although there is
wide dispersion in the behavior of individual plants, there is a
central tendency, and this central tendency normally is around the
point of zero change in margins(i.e. the gap between price and
direct cost is a constant percentage of price).
This discussion is not intended to imply that all the discrepancies
between the changes in direct costs and the changes in price which
appear in Table 7 can in fact be explained by problems of aggrega-
tion. On the contrary, some of the actual correspondence between
direct cost and price change may well be the result of the fact that
a number of essentially dissimilar groups have been combined, and
in doing so their differences have been averaged out.
There are a number of other considerations, besides that of ag-
gregation, which should be taken into account in appraising these
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statistics. First, the records upon which the statistics are based are
accounting records, and for small firms especially records of labor
cost and materials cost are not kept uniformly and consistently from
year to year or from firm to firm; similarly, the valuation of in-
ventories on different bases will obviously lead to difficulties in inter-
pretation. Secondly, price would be expected to move with marginal
cost only when there have been no technological changes, no sig-
nificant institutional changes, and no secular growth or decline.
Over a two-year period some such changes are bound to occur, and
to the extent that they do margins could be expected to shift.
Finally, it has been assumed that marginal cost corresponds to direct
cost, with direct cost computed as average labor and materials cost
per unit of output(i.e. that all production functions are linear).
In actual fact, the productivity of labor in many industries is af-
fected by the scale of output,5' and in such cases the change in direct
cost may not be a good indicator of the change in marginal cost
and so should not necessarily agree with the change in price. Any
adequate analysis of the discrepancies between the change in direct
costs and the change in prices in manufacturing industries must
take all of these factors into account.
DISTRIBUTIVE TRADES
THE products processed by the manufacturer, and some of the prod-
ucts coming direct from the farmer, must pass through the channels
of distribution. Direct costs in the distributive trades are primarily
the goods purchased for resale to other distributors or to consumers.
The labor costs and other materials costs and the rent can generally
be considered fixed over rather wide ranges of output, so that the
purchase price of goods for resale(including transportation)is
fairly closely identified with the industry's marginal cost. Here again,
the analysis is hampered by the fact that very little information is
available, but something can be done with the concept of gross mar-
gins. In the distributive trades the difference between the prices paid
by the distributors for goods and the prices received by them for the
same goods is normally expressed as a percentage of final price and
is termed gross margin. This concept differs from markup in that it
is calculated on the basis of actual receipts (including discounts,
sales, etc.) rather than on the basis of quoted prices. Table 8 gives
51Inthis connection see the studies of the Production, Employment, and
Productivity in 59 Manufacturing industries, National Research Project, Works
Progress Administration, iq.
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the percentage gross margins for a variety of different distributors.
For almost all groups there is no significant change in gross mar-
TABLE 8
Percentage Gross Margins in the Distributive Trades, 1929.1932
Percentage Gross Margin
Number
Type of Establishment of Stores 1929 1930 1931 1933
Wholesalegrocers, Ohio 17 12 11 11 10
Wholesale machinery supply 35-44 24 24 24 25
Meat markets, Chicago 34-50 22 25 28 29
Food chains 17,754-33,147 20 n.a. 22 22
Clothing stores, sales, to $100,000 n.a., 36
Specialty stores 70-85 34 34 33 32
Chain shoestores 66s-s,6i 34 n.a. n.a. 33
Variety chains 1,579-2,188 33 n.a. 32 31
Department stores, sales,
to $io million 21-30 34 34 34 34
Departmentstores, sales,
$..$io million 44-54 34 34 33 33
Department stores, sales.
$L.$4million 110-142 32 32 32 32
Department stores, sales.
$500.000-$1,000,000 57-95 31 31 31 31
Department stores, sales,
$25o,000-$500,000 115.167 29 50 29 29
n.a.(not available).
Source: M. P. McNair, S. F.Teele, and F. C. Mulhearn,DistributionCosts
(HarvardUniversity Press,1941),pp.419, 583, 431, 387, 246, 222, 285, 288, 112,
iI, io8, 109, io6,107,105.
gins in the period 1929-1932. The one major exception is Chicago
meat markets; gross margins here rose from 22 per cent in 1929 tO
29 per cent in 1932. Whether or not meat markets are a significant
exception cannot really be determined on evidence at present avail-
able, but by and large it does not appear that the gross margins in
the distributive trades change violently with a contraction in de-
mand and costs. In other words, prices charged by the distributive
trades tend to follow closely the prices they have to pay for the
goods they sell.
SUMMARY
THIS examination of the different industrial sectors of the economy
during the period 1929-1932 indicates that their actual behavior was
consistent with the explanations which would be offered by a student
taking his first course in value theory. At no stage in the discussion
has it been necessary to consider the effect of industrial concentra-
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tion to explain the relation between the fall in direct costs and the
fall in price. The major determinants of price changes, according
to both the theory and the empirical findings, should be(1) the
relative importance of agriculture in the economy, and the extent to
which demand for agricultural goods falls; (2) the nature of mineral
resources and the importance of labor cost in mining, coupled with
the extent to which demand for mineral goods falls; ()thefall in
the wage rate and its effect on labor cost;52 and ()theshape of
production functions.
Generally speaking, economists are accustomed to taking as given
the technological and institutional elements of the economic system.
The relative magnitude of agriculture in the economy, the distribu-
tion of mineral resources, and the shape of production functions are
all of this nature. The change in demand and the change in the wage
rate and its relation to labor cost, however, are more properly eco-
nomic problems. Income analysis in its more recent forms attempts
to predict the changes in the patterns of consumption and invest-
ment in the economy; if this attempt becomes successful it should
be possible by studying behavior patterns to predict changes in de-
mand for various kinds of final goods and trace these back to the
derived demands for agricultural and mineral goods.
An adequate theory of the wage rate is, however, still lacking. This
lack is much more serious than might at first appear. Throughout
the analysis up to this point, it has been implicitly assumed that
when changes in direct costs agreed with changes in prices, it was
not because the direct costs themselves were determined by prices.
Should the causality run in the opposite direction, i.e. should direct
costs be determined by prices instead of by other forces, the ques-
tion of what determines prices would still remain open. It is prob-
able that the price of a producer's final product does not affect the
cost of his materials except through its effect on his demand for
the materials, but this is not necessarily true of labor cost. If the
wage rate in a plant is sensitive to the price of the final good which
the plant produces rather than to the profit or loss of the plant
or to the change in output, it may well be that costs will cease to
52 To the extent that differences in the behavior of the wage rate might be
explained by differences in industrial concentration, however, it is still possible
that industrial concentration would in factaffect prices. For an analysis of
monopoly as a possible determinant of interindustry wage structure, see Joseph
W. Garbarino, A Theory of Interindustry Wage Structure Variation," Quarterh'
Journal of Economics, May 1950, pp. 282-305.
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be an explanation of prices, and that instead it will be possible to
predict wage changes by changes in prices. This matter would bear
further looking into, and until some adequate explanation of what
wage rates do depend on can be given, the theory itself is incom-
plete.
As a final qualification of the empirical findings, it should be
noted that the relationships observed for the period 1929-1932 may
no longer be relevant." If, for example, there is considerable public
pressure to limit the profits of producers, it would be quite possible
that producers would not operate so as to maximize profits in the
short run. Furthermore, it may no longer be true that the price of
agricultural materials will rise and fall more than labor cost. In-
dustry-wide bargaining and the sensitivity of labor to changes in
the cost-of-living index may render wages more highly variable, at
least in the upward direction," and in the downward direction agri-
cultural price supports may prevent the normal fall in agricultural
prices. Finally, governmental action in imposing rationing and price
control might have a strong effect on price-cost relationships. For all
these reasons today's pattern may be quite different from the pattern
of twenty years ago.
The relevance of the findings in Part 3 for the topic of price flexi-
bility as it was conceived by Means and those who came after him
needs no particular elaboration. The major patterns of price be-
havior in the economy can be adequately explained in terms of
factors other than industrial concentration. This is not to say that
in some instances the consideration of the industrial organization of
an industry might not be necessary, nor that in explaining wage-
price relationships monopoly and monopolistic relationships need
53 The empirical evidence for the period 1929-1932 does not throw any light
on what would happen with rising income and demand. Periods of upswing are
more difficult to analyze because the movement tends to be slower and because
technology is more apt to change. An examination of the relatively rapid up-
swing of 1921-1923hasbeen made, however, and it appears that price behavior
in this upswing was in general accord with what would be expected.
54 In this connection the significance of guaranteed annual wages is interesting.
Insofar as guaranteed annual wages remove some of the cost-of-production
workers from marginal cost and make their wages a fixed cost which must be
paid regardless of the level oi operation, the importance of labor in marginal
cost would be reduced over certain ranges of output. At points of production
above the level consonant with the guaranteed wage, however, the normal rela-
tion of price to direct labor and materials cost would continue. If materials costs
in the industry in question are variable, prices with guaranteed annual wages
would tend to be more variable at points under "normal" output, but not
different at points above "normal" output.
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not be explored. What can be said, rather, is that even if monopoly
did not exist a price system very similar to the existing one would
emerge as long as wages were less flexible than agricultural prices
and some mineral prices.
4. The Theory of Price Behavior and Aggregative Price indexes
IN THE preceding section, the theory of price behavior has been
analyzed in terms of a disaggregation of the economy. There still
remains, however, the question whether this theory of price behavior
is compatible with the aggregative price indexes covering the econ-
omy as a whole. For an explanation of price behavior to be com-
pletely satisfactory, it is necessary to show that it can in fact explain
both micro- and macroeconomic behavior. This final section, there-
fore, will consider whether or not the theory of price behavior out-
lined in the preceding section provides a valid explanation of (i)
the behavior of component prices in consumer-price indexes, (2) the
behavior of the wholesale-price index, and ()therelative move-
ments of real and money wage rates.
THE CONSUMER-PRICE INDEX
THE major components of the consumer-price index which are
available for the United States are food, apparel, rent, gas and
electricity, other fuels, ice, house furnishings, and miscellaneous.
The price indexes for these components are shown in Table g for
the period 1929-195 1, along with the cumulative decline from 1929
to various stages of the depression and the cumulative rise from
1933 to various stages of retovery. The price indexes for food show
the greatest cumulative movement in each stage. This is of course
what would be expected, since foods are agricultural products that
reach the consumer without any very great degree of processing by
labor. The indexes for apparel move somewhat less than those for
food; again this would be expected since, although most of the
materials involved come from agriculture, the goods go through
more processing by labor before they reach the consumer. House
furnishings are somewhat similar to apparel, but contain more non-
textile components. In the first two years of the decline house fur-
nishings did drop more than apparel, but by 1932 and 1933 the
drop in apparel was very much greater. Rent presents a special
problem. In the earlier stages of the depression the rent index did
not drop as much as food, apparel, or house furnishings, but by
1933 it had dropped considerably more than house furnishings and
489PRICE FLEXIBILITY AND CHANGES
TABLE g
Consumers-Price Index by Commodity Groups, 1929.1951,
andCumulative Percentage Changes, 1929-1941
House
Gas andOther Fur-Miscel-
Year Total FoodApparelRentElectricityFuels Icenishingslaneous
INDEXES (1935.1939100)
1929 123 133 115 141 113 112 105
1930 119 126 113 i38 111 109 105
1931 109 104 103 130 109 g8 104
1932 g8 87 91 ii6 103 85 102
1933 92 84 88 100 100 84 g8
1934 96 93 96 94 102 93 g8
1935 98 100 97 94 103 99 na. 95
1936 101 g8 g6 191 199 n.a. g6 g8
1937 103 105 103 101 99 191 na. 104 101
1938 101 g8 102 104 99 101 na. 103 102
1939 99 95 101 104 99 99 100 101 101
1940 100 97 102 105 98 102 100 101 101
1941 105 io6 io6 so6 97 io8 104 107 104
1942 117 124 124 109 97 115 110 122 111
1943 124 138 130 io8 g6 121 114 136 ii6
1944 126 136 139 io8 g6 126 ii6 136 121
1945 128 139 146 so8 95 128 ii6 146 124
1946 139 159 i6o 109 92 137 ii6 159 129
1947 159 193 i86 111 92 156 126 184 140
1948 171 210 186 117 94 183 135 195 150
1949 169 202 190 121 97 iSS 140 i8g 155
1950 172 205 i88 131 190 157
1951 186 228 205 136 211 165
CUMULATIVEPERCENTAGE CHANGES
1929.1930 —5 —2 —2 —2 —3 0
1929-1931 —22 —10 —8 —4 —12 —1
1929-1932 —35 —31 —18 —9 —24 —3
1929-1933 —37 —34—31 —13 —25 —7
1933-1934 +11 +9 __6 +2 +11 0
1933-1935 +19 +10 —6 +13 0
1933-1936 +20 +11 —4 +'4 0
1933-1937 +25 +'7 +1 +24 +3
1937-1938 —7 —' +3 —1
1933.1939 +13 +'4 +4 +20 +3
'933'94° +15 +16 +5 +20 +3
1933.1941 +26 +20 +6 +27 +6
n.a. (not available).
Sources: Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1950,Dept.of Commerce, p. 285; Federal
Reserve Bulletin, May 1952, p. 548.
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it continued to drop in 1934, reaching a level 44 per cent below
1929—a greater drop than that shown by any other component.
Rents could be expected to be somewhat sticky in their response
to a decline in economic activity, because they are contracted for
on a longer-term basis than most consumer prices. However, it would
appear that the relatively fixed stock of housing makes rent very
sensitive to demand if the period of adjustment is long enough. For
gas and electricity, fuel, and ice, only a combined index is available
for the period 1929-1933. It is evident from inspection of the com-
ponent indexes for later years, however, that this index combines
a number of different types of price behavior. Gas and electricity
show very little variability, as would be expected in view of public-
utility price-setting procedures. Ice uses as materials primarily elec-
tricity and water—both utilities—and these combined with some
labor would determine its price behavior. As would be expected the
price of ice is, next to gas and electricity, the least variable of the
consumer-price components. The fuel index is based largely upon
price changes in coal and fuel oil. The price of coal would be ex-
pected to be considerably less variable than that of fuel oil, since
it has a much larger labor component; thus the fuel index com-
bines a fairly invariant price index with a more variable one to yield
an index of about the same variability as those of apparel and
house furnishings. The index for miscellaneous items, finally, is com-
posed of such prices as street-car and bus fares, upkeep of automo-
biles, medical care, newspapers, radios, motion pictures, other recre-
ation, barber and beauty-shop services, and toilet articles. These
prices tend to be relatively less variable because of such factors as
rate regulation and customary prices, as well as the importance of
labor services and the high degree of fabrication.
The behavior of the different components of the index followed
somewhat the same pattern after 1939 as before, except that the
effects of price control are quite evident. Food prices did not rise
as much as would have been expected in terms of the rise in apparel
and house furnishings. From 1941 to 1945, in fact, the prices of both
apparel and house furnishings rose byper cent, whereas food
rose by only 31 per cent. This is probably due to the greater ease of
controlling food prices—the lower-priced lines in apparel and house
furnishings tended to disappear from the market. With the end of
the war and the removal of price control, the prewar relationship
among the components in the consumer-price index was restored.
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It is thus apparent that the relative movements of the various
components of the consumer-price index do behave approximately
as would be expected on the basis of the preceding analysis of the
determinants of relative prices. Any detailed analysis of the exact
year-to-year movements would of course have to take into account
such factors as the relative sizes of the agricultural harvests, the ex-
tent of government and foreign demand for agricultural products,
the various rounds of wage increases, and the secular changes in
productivity in different parts of the economy. Each of these ele-
ments has a role in determining relative price movements. But the
basic structure of consumers' prices and the major changes that can
be expected in this structure during periods of economic fluctuation
do emerge quite clearly from this relatively simple analysis.
THE WHOLESALE-PRICE INDEX
THE BLS wholesale-price index is based on some 900 price series and
1,700 price quotations. Prices for the same commodity at several
different stages of production are often included. For example, cot-
ton appears in the index as raw cotton, cotton yarn, cotton gray
goods, cotton piece goods, and cotton clothing. For each of these
stages a representative commodity sample has been selected and
priced at the primary market level of distribution. In the remaining
space of this paper it would not be feasible to go through each of
these series in the manner that was done for the cost-of-living index.
Instead, it will be useful to give some brief attention to the general
aggregative nature of the series. The wider variability of the whole-
sale-price index over the cost-of-living index is well known. In terms
of the theory of price behavior suggested by this paper, this greater
variability would be expected. As was pointed out in Partabove,
the prices of agricultural raw materials and semifinished goods
would be expected to exhibit greater variability than the prices of
finished goods. This expectation is based on the observation that
(i) the labor-cost element tends to be less variable than the prices
of agricultural raw materials; and(2)thehigher the degree of
fabrication, the more important labor costs become relative to the
cost of the original agricultural raw materials in the total direct
cost. Since price tends to move with direct cost, the larger the in-
fluence of labor costs in direct cost, the more the variability of
final output prices will tend to decline to that of labor costs. Many
Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1950,Dept.of Labor, igt,p. ii7.
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agricultural raw materials and semifinished products are included
in the wholesale-price index, whereas these same items are excluded
from the consumers-price index, since only fully processed goods
reach the consumer. Since the theory of price behavior outlined in
Part 2 would thus produce a greater variability for the wholesale.
price index, and since this greater variability is in fact found, there
is no evidence from this test that there is any basic contradiction be-
tween the general nature of the wholesale-price index and the theory
of price behavior.
The wholesale.price concept originated in the period when eco-
nomic theory was concerned with the relation between the "price
level" and the quantity of money. Economic statisticians regarded
the wholesale-price index as a sampling of prices in the system, and
thus in some sense a measure of the level around which prices tended
to cluster. Economists tried to differentiate between situations in
which relative prices in the price structure changed and those in
which the general level of price itself changed. Changes in the price
level were considered to involve only random changes in the price
structure. But such a dichotomy is possible only if changes in the level
are not systematically related to changes in the structure. According to
the foregoing analysis of the determinants of price change, any price
movement in the system necessarily involves relative price changes;
a change in level without a change in structure is impossible. With
a change in income the primary response will be in the prices of
agricultural goods, and the repercussions will diminish as the goods
become more and more highly fabricated. The "price level" of ag-
ricultural materials and some mineral materials is thus always in
flux, being affected by such things as the level of income, foreign
demand, and weather conditions. But the "price level" of highly
processed goods may hardly vary at all.
As an indicator of the "level" of prices, therefore, the wholesale-
price index is not a meaningful economic construct; rather itis
merely a conglomeration of those price quotations which are easiest
to get. Vertically unintegrated industries will provide a much greater
number of price quotations, and even if these more numerous prices
are weighted by value added at each stage the result will not be the
same as that which would be obtained using the final.goods price
of an integrated industry. Whenever a product contains materials
of agricultural origin or of mineral origin with variable prices, the
price variation will be dampened as the degree of fabrication in-
creases, approaching the variation of labor cost. The variability at-
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tributed to an industry's prices in the wholesale-price index, there-
fore, will depend upon the particular stages in the fabrication
process for which price quotations are included. It is probably no
exaggeration to say that the wholesale-price index is no better as an
indicator of inflation and deflation than freight-car loadings are of
the deflated gross national product_if as good.
RELATIVE MOVEMENT OF REAL AND MONEY WAGE RATES
STATISTICAL information on the movement of an index of the real
wage rate has appeared in the economic literature from time to time,
but the conclusions to be drawn from this data were never very
c1ear.° The analysis of the determinants of relative price changes
presented in the body of this paper is related to this discussion and
can throw some light on what should be expected in terms of the
relation between the consumer-price index and the money wage rate.
With a fall in the money wage rate and a contraction in income,
the components of the consumer-price index can be divided into
groups of commodity and service prices which will(i) fall faster
than the wage rate, (2) fall with the wage rate, and ()fallless than
the wage rate. Goods whose value contains an appreciable propor-
tion of agricultural or variable-priced mineral materials will vary
more than the money wage rate. Goods which are highly fabricated
or whose value is mostly labor services will vary directly with the
money wage rate. Finally, goods whose prices are administratively
fixed, i.e. utilities, will change less than the money wage rate. Rent
56 See for example John T. Dunlop. "The Movement of Real and Money
Wages," EconomicJournal,September 1938; J. M. Keynes, "Relative Movements
of Real Wages and Output," EconomicJournal,March iq9, pp. 34-5'; L. Tarshis,
"Changes in Real and Money Wages," Economic Journal, 1939, pp. '50-154; J.
Henry Richardson, "Real Wage Movements," Economic Journal, September
1939; Richard Ruggles, "The Relative Movements of Real and Money Wage
Rates," Quarterly Journal of Economics, November 1940, pp. 130-149. In his
original article, Keynes stated that prices would rise faster than money wages
in recovery because in perfect competition a producer would be faced with a
rising marginal-cost function, and prices of output would therefore have to rise
faster than the wage rate as output expanded. In attempting to generalize the
problem for an economy as a whole, Dunlop used the cost-of-living index as a
measure of price change, but these are in fact not the prices which are ger-
mane to the theoretical discussion. Prices in this context should have been re-
stricted to the selling prices of the producers who actually paid the wage rates.
The cost-of-living index is a conglomeration of prices which are paid by con-
sumers. It includes agricultural prices, import prices, rent, and prices of con-
sumer services. However, although the cost-of-living and money-wage-rate con-
troversy was not meaningful in terms of its original problem, it is still interesting
to ask how real wage rates behave at different phases of economic fluctuations.
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is the one element in consumers' expenditures which cannot be
classified in this manner. As noted above, in the short run rent may
be fairly inflexible because of contractual obligations, but in the
longer run it becomes extremely flexible. The question whether a
decrease in the money wage rate will cause an increase or a decrease
in the real wage rate will thus depend on the importance in terms
of weights and degree of variability of the prices which are more
variable than the money wage rate compared with the prices which
are less variable than the money wage rate. The relative variability
of the different prices will depend on the magnitude of the total
income decline which accompanies the decline in the money wage
rate. For an exact prediction in any particular instance, it would
be necessary to know how much investment, government expendi.
tures, and the propensities of various groups to consume change, as
well as changes in foreign demand for agricultural goods and the
influence of changes in weather conditions. But some general con-
clusions can be drawn. In a mild recession or in the early phases of
a major depression it would be quite possible for the real wage
rate to decline, largely because of the lag in the response of rent to
changes in income. In a deeper, more prolonged depression, how-
ever, it seems likely that the real wage rate would rise. Rent be-
comes more variable than money wage rates in the longer run, so
that the only components of expenditures whose prices remain less
flexible than money wage rates are a few public utilities.
An adequate empirical investigation of this problem would be
particularly hard because of the difficulty of obtaining a measure
of the money wage rate for an economy as a whole. In addition, re-
tail-price quotations always involve the problem of the failure to
take adequate account of the change in the quality of goods. For
these reasons, the problem of the movement of real and money wage
rates will probably remain in the sphere of pure theory for some
time.
COMMENT
KERMIT GORDON, Williams College
THE positive content of Ruggles' paper is essentially the develop.
ment of a few simple hypotheses to account for the broad patterns
of price behavior in the United States in the period 1929-193 i.These
hypotheses may be summarized as follows:
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1.Thecollapse in the prices of agricultural goods was attributable
to the stability of agricultural output in the face of a drop in de-
mand, which stability was in turn attributable to the shape of
marginal cost curves in agriculture.
2. The prices of some minerals fell by about the same percentage
as unit direct costs, while the prices of others fell more sharply than
Unit direct costs. By and large, price behavior of the former type
occurred in minerals industries in which supply curves tended
toward the horizontal, while that of the latter type characterized
industries with rising supply curves.
3. The prices of manufactured goods tended to decline in the same
proportion as unit direct costs; the decline in unit direct costs in
turn tended to be large if agricultural raw materials or some min-
erals bulked large in direct costs, and to be small to the extent that
labor, some minerals, and labor-intensive manufactured goods
bulked large in direct costs.
4. The prices of goods sold in the distributive trades tended also
to decline in the same proportion as the decline in unit direct costs.
Two significant inferences may be drawn from Ruggles' findings,
one of which is implicit in the structure of his argument, while the
other is explicitly set forth. First, if we assume the validity of a
series of quite daring assumptions, Ruggles' findings may be in-
terpreted as indicating that firms by and large tended to equate
marginal cost and marginal revenue in approved textbook fashion.
It must be emphasized, however, that the empirical validation of
this proposition involves so many bold assumptions, both of a
theoretical and a statistical character, that it can hardly be regarded
as more than a plausible conjecture.
In the context of the present volume, the second conclusion is
the more relevant—i.e. that "the major patterns of price behavior
in the economy can be adequately explained in terms of factors
other than industrial concentration." While Ruggles does not en-
tirely rule out the possibility that differences in concentration ratios
(or in some other index of market organization) may have some
effect on differences in cyclical price behavior, he does feel, at least
for the period he has studied, that the influence of these factors is
at best peripheral, and that the forces emphasized in his own analy-
sis are overwhelmingly more important. In manufacturing and dis-
tribution, Ruggles appears to feel that the correspondence between
changes in unit direct costs and changes in price is so close that
little remains to be explained. Thus Ruggles appears to go even
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farther than Neal,' with whose principal conclusions he is in sub-
stantial agreement, for Neal went on to study the relation between
concentration ratios and the sensitivity of price to changes in unit
direct costs, finding that concentration "does affect the flexibility
of price relative to direct cost," but "only to a minor extent."2
In one respect at least, Ruggles' claim is certainly too broad. He
concludes his discussion of agricultural price behavior with this
statement: "Agriculture, then, because of the nature of its marginal
costs, would be expected to maintain its output in the face of a fall
in demand. .. Thewhole impact of a contraction in demand falls
on price; price will decline until the full quantity produced can
be absorbed by the economy."
If this statement were so, Ruggles would have succeeded in ac
counting for the broad movements of agricultural prices without
introducing considerations of market organization. But the shape
of the farmer's marginal cost curve does not in itself explain the
fact that he will maintain output in the face of a fall in demand;
a monopolistic firm might have a marginal cost curve for all the
world like a wheat farmer's, but its response to a decline in demand
might be quite different. Ruggles' conclusion follows only if it is
also specified that the firm in agriculture is operating in a steeply
rising range of its marginal cost curve, but this is so only because
an unregulated agriculture, in its major branches, is purely com-
petitive. Hence it appears to be logically necessary to invoke con-
siderations of market organization to explain the behavior of agri-
cultural prices.
A similar point relates to Ruggles' treatment of price behavior
in the minerals industries. Here he finds a more complex pattern of
price movements than in the other major sectors of the economy,
but his explanation of price behavior in this area is somewhat ob-
scure and is marred by the implicit assumption of the prevalence
of pure competition—an assumption not valid in many branches
of minerals production.
Some comments may be made, also, regarding Ruggles' explana-
tion of the behavior of the prices of manufactured goods. His find-
ings, taken together with those of Neal, establish quite conclusively
that the predominant influence governing price behavior in the
period studied was the behavior of unit direct costs. The link be-
1AlfredC. Neal, Industrial Concentration and Price Flexibility(American
Council on Public Affairs, L942).
2 Ibid.,p. 140.
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tween prices and direct costs is so strong that it must certainly be
the starting point in any future analysis of cyclical price flexibility
of manufactured goods.
However, the following qualifications and amplifications suggest
themselves:
i. Additional calculations indicate that if Ruggles had used a
broader sample for his comparisons of percentage changes in unit
direct cost and unit value in various agricultural and minerals
processing industries, the correspondence between the two might
have been somewhat less striking.(See his Tablesand 6.) In-
dustries are easy to find in which the divergence between percentage
decline in unit direct cost and percentage decline in value per unit
was significantly greater than in most of the industries represented
in these tables. Indeed, there are some cases in which unit direct
cost fell so much more sharply than unit value that the unit over-
head.plus-proflt margin increased.
2. In industries in which unit direct cost in 1929 stood in a very
high ratio to unit value, it would seem a priori unlikely that the
percentage decline in these two variables could diverge widely. At
one extreme, unit value is not free, except in very unusual circum-
stances, to fall below unit direct cost; at the other extreme, given
the condition of markets in depression, few industries will be in a
position to raise the unit overhead-plus-profit margin (i.e. the dif-
ference between unit direct cost and unit value) above the pre-
depression level. If these two points are taken as establishing the
limits of the extent to which the degrees of decline may diverge,
and if the ratio of unit direct cost to unit value in a particular
industry in 1929was,say 90percent, then a decline in unit direct
cost of, say 30 per cent is consistent with a price decline of not less
than 27 per cent and not more than 37 per cent. By contrast, if an
industry in 1929 had a low ratio of unit direct cost to unit value—
say 50 per cent—then a o per cent decline in unit direct cost
would be compatible on these assumptions with a decline in unit
value of as much as 65 per cent and as little as 15 per cent. Hence
the higher the ratio of unit direct cost to unit value, the narrower
are the limits within which percentage declines in these variables
are free to diverge.
An examination of the 1929censusdata for the manufacturing
3Thiscategory would include such industries as ice cream, malt, linoleum,
soap, rubber tires and tubes, asbestos products, and wall board and plaster
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industries studied by Ruggles (Tables 4 and 6) indicates that these
industries tended to have higher ratios of direct costs to value of
products than did the broader industry groups into which they fell.
Of twenty-two manufacturing industries listed in Tables 4 and 6,'
sixteen had ratios of direct costs to value of products that were
higher than the ratios for their census industry groups. An extreme
case is the food and kindred products industry group. For the group
as a whole, the ratio of direct costs to value of products was 79 per
cent, but for the four industries in Table 4 that fell into this group,
the ratios ranged from 85 to 91 per cent.
Hence there is some reason to believe that a different sample of
industries, in which the ratios of direct cost to value of product
were more representative of the respective industry groups, might
have displayed a less perfect relationship between percentage price
decline and percentage direct cost decline than did the industries
studied by Ruggles.
3. Although the unit overhead-plus-profit margin is simply the
difference between unit direct cost and unit value, one may not
properly infer from the fact of an approximately equal percentage
decline in direct cost and unit value that the unit overhead-plus-
profit margin fell by about the same percentage. This seeming para-
dox arises because a high ratio of unit direct cost to unit value im-
plies a low ratio of unit overhead-plus-profit to unit value; hence a
relatively slight divergence in the degree of decline of unit direct cost
and unit value may make possible a large divergence between these
two percentages and the percentage decline in the unit overhead-
plus-profit margin.
For example, Ruggles' Table 4 shows, for cane sugar refining, a
decline in unit direct cost of ii percent as compared with a de-
cline in unit value of so per cent. However, since the 1929 ratio
of direct cost to value of products in this industry was go per cent,
the narrow margin by which the decline in unit cost exceeded the
decline in unit value resulted in a decline in the unit overhead-plus-
profit margin of only 2 per cent.
Hence itit not permissible, from a knowledge of percentage
change in unit direct cost and unit value alone, to draw any con-
clusion concerning the behavior of the unit overhead-plus-profit
margin. This observation amplifies rather than qualifies Ruggles'
4Includingall but manufactured heating and illuminating gas, which Ruggles
treatsas anatypical case.
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analysis, but it is a point that deserves emphasis because much of
the past interest in the question of cyclical price flexibility has been
closely associated with an interest in the cyclical behavior of mar-
gins..Ifone concludes that Ruggles' essay suggests a somewhat greater
sensitivity of the prices of manufactured goods to direct cost changes
than probably prevailed in 1929-1931,oneis then led to ask whether
market organization factors may have played some part in account-
ing for differences in degrees of sensitivity. This question was studied
in a particular framework by Neal,5 who used the well-known census
concentration ratios in conjunction with an analysis of price—direct-
cost behavior. Neal found, as previously noted, that concentration
does affect the sensitivity of price to direct cost changes, but the
relationship appears to be quite weak. Neal's evidence fully supports
his conclusion.
This might well be the end of the matter, if there were not
abundant reason to be dissatisfied with the census concentration
data as a measure of market characteristics that may be associated
with differences in the sensitivity of price to cyclical direct cost
changes. The shortcomings of the census concentration ratios as
measures of market power are numerous and well known. Hence it
must still be considered an open question as to whether a more re-
liable index of degree of market power, if it were possible to devise
one, might show a closer relationship between extent of market
power and sensitivity of price to direct cost changes.
GEORGE H. HILDEBRAND, University of California
RUGGLES has set four principal tasks for himself in this interesting
paper: (i)tosummarize the present state of the literature on price
flexibility;(2)todevelop his own criterion of flexibility; ()totest
price behavior during 1929-1931invarious parts of the economy,
using his criterion; and, rather indirectly ()toevaluate the im-
portance of industrial concentration as a determinant of price flexi-
bility. His central conclusion is a strong one and deserves mention
at the outset. It is that the "major patterns of price behavior in the
economy can be adequately explained in terms of factors other than.
industrial concentration." As will become evident subsequently, his
explanation squares perfectly with the traditional theory of short-
5Neal,op.cit., Chap.VI.
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period price formation. Clearly, this finding is somewhat novel for
the concentration field, and in any case of high interest.
Perhaps the most important purpose of studies of concentration
is to gauge its significance for short- and long-period changes in the
structure of relative prices. The question is certainly appropriate.
Interest in concentration was originally stimulated by the recogni-
tion that in certain industries sellers were few, which suggested the
possibility that fewness could lead to unusual power over price. If
so, then these prices should show some variance of behavior relative
to those formed in markets involving large numbers. On this reason-
ing, Gardner Means some twenty years ago opened up the issue with
his now famous study of the comparative flexibility of industrial and
agricultural prices. Means' findings have since been severely criti-
cized on sound technical grounds, but interest in the problems he
raised remains very much alive.
Inquiry into the possible impacts of concentration upon changes
in price structure takes two main forms. With the publication of
Schumpeter's provocative and unorthodox views concerning concen-
tration, large-scale enterprise, and their connection with techno-
logical change, the way was opened to investigation of changes in
relative prices over very long periods. So far, this problem has re-
ceived only limited attention, though its importance is recognized.
By contrast, much effort has been applied to the short-period, in-
vestigation given impetus by price behavior during the great de-
pression. These studies have been concerned with the impacts upon
relative prices of marked change in aggregate demand. Ruggles'
paper is an important contribution to this literature.
The fact that prices change relatively to one another when ef-
fective demand changes is only the beginning of the question. Cer-
tainly there is no a priori reason to expect all prices to change pro-
portionally and in the same direction. Thus the inquiry cannot be
limited simply to one of measurement. It must be informed by some
guiding theoretical conception. In other words, the theorist re-
quires some criterion for the comparison of "expected" with "actual"
price changes in particular cases. Only then can he isolate deviant
cases. Many criteria have been proposed, some normative, which
proclaim how much all prices ought to change; others purely hypo-
thetical, which attempt to predict how much prices would have
changed if certain determinants were effective and others not.
Clearly, if the question of structural flexibility is to be linked to
something we may vaguely call monopoly power, then what is
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needed is a criterion by which those cases in which that power is
effective can be isolated from the universe of prices as a whole. If
I interpret him correctly, Ruggles has attacked the question by
adoption of the Walrasian model as a reference point (nonnorma-
tive) for the formation of relative prices. By use of a criterion de-
rived from this model, he has then attempted to find out whether
changes in relative prices during 1929-1931 did or did not conform
to the predictions yielded by that model.
Conventional short-period price theory emphasizes two principal
determinants, those of demand and of cost. Selling price will shift
to a new equilibrium (barring the kinked-oligopoly case) with a
shift in either determinant or of both together. However, if with a
change of demand or a cost-invoked move along the demand sched-
ule, the elasticity of demand is the same at the new point 'of equi-
librium as it was at the old, then selling price will change propor-
tionally to and in the same direction as the change in short-period
marginal cost. Furthermore, this will be true whether the change
in marginal cost involves a shift in or a move along the cost sched-
ule. Thus it is a change in the elasticity of demand that makes for
perverse behavior of the price-cost relationship in a given case. Al-
ternatively, on Ruggles' criterion, prices show perfect flexibility
when they move directly and proportionally with short-period mar-
ginal cost. Otherwise they are inflexible, excessively flexible, or in-
versely flexible.
Using this criterion of perfect price flexibility, Ruggles can iso-
late the effects of changes in demand elasticity without undertaking
the impossible task of measuring them. He can limit the statistical
problem to measurement of relative changes in prices and costs. If
the results fail to conform to the criterion, then he infers that a
change in demand elasticity has intervened as an additional de-
terminant.
Changes in elasticity of demand normally can be expected when
the seller has a sloped demand curve and his cost schedule shifts,
or when his sloped demand curve shifts and he must find a new
price-output equilibrium. Such phenomena would occur in cases of
monopolistic competition or pure monopoly. Oligopoly is more
difficult because competition is "co.respective" and various alterna-
tive hypotheses become possible. Still, even here if the behavior of
prices under oligopoly were deviant, Ruggles' criterion would reveal
it. Assuming that the data are adequate to its use, then, Ruggles
can contend that his criterion is a workable method for turning up
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important cases of impure markets—"important" in the sense that
prices there were found to be rigid, sluggish, or perverse relative to
changes in marginal costs.
When it comes to the empirical utility of his approach, Ruggles
displays appropriate caution and declares that his findings are
"purely illustrative." They are studded with many needed reserva-
tions and qualifications. I must admit, however, that at times I found
it difficult to follow the exact nature of the statistical operations em-
ployed. If I comprehend them correctly, they rest upon these prin-
ciples:(i) to use average direct cost (suitably weighted for relative
amounts of cost pertaining to production labor and to materials) as
an approximation of short-period marginal cost;(2) to use average
value product as a measure of selling "price" for the composite
product; and ()touse matched census data for the foregoing in
each category examined. On this basis, Ruggles tests for flexibility
for a group of rather narrowly defined and relatively homogeneous
industries, and also for broader and in my opinion less reliable
aggregates.
The inevitable statisticalfrailties and expedient assumptions
turned up, and these are candidly noted and evaluated. Moreover, it
is a marked advantage to use data that in the main are homogeneous
as to reporting source; to use wage costs for production labor rather
than that treacherous substitute, average hourly earnings; and to
use value product per unit of output as a synthetic price, in place of
frequently deceptive quoted prices. Yet, as Ruggles himself observes,
the value product technique has its own shortcomings. Given an
"industry" in the sense of a statistical box, one will usually find
multiple products and multiple markets; and varying markups by
product, by firm, and by plant. Value product will serve as a measure
of price only when the contents of the statistical box are really
homogeneous. Otherwise one will derive an artifact rather than an
indicator of actual price change. For this reason more confidence
may be placed in Ruggles' findings for the narrower segments of
the economy.
The outcome of his inquiry led Ruggles to the conclusions men-
tioned earlier, that relative prices in 1929-1931 changed in a manner
that could be expected from value theory, and that the patterns
found could be explained without appeal to industrial concentra-
tion as a special factor. In that period, direct costs throughout the
system were determined by these influences:(i) the prices of agri-
cultural raw materials, which mainly are "demand-controlled" be-
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cause the shape of the cost function leads to continuous production
at capacity; (2) the price of mineral products, which tend to move
inversely with output because of varying richness of deposits; ()
theform of the production and marginal cost functions in each
industry; and ()thelevel of the wage rate. The forces of techno-
logical change and of secular growth or decay of industries may be
ignored because the period is short.
As Ruggles views the behavior of prices during 1929-1931, de-
flation lowered agricultural demand, and through this the prices of
farm products. This helped depress wage costs. Materials and wage
costs together lowered direct costs in varying degrees in the later
stages of processing and fabrication, and selling prices generally
moved downward in the same proportions. Prices paid by distribu-
tive trades thus fell, and even with constant gross margins, their
selling prices also dropped.
While I certainly would not dispute Ruggles' account of price
formation or of the interrelations among prices in the system, I
think his conclusions are likely to be misleading. His statistical
inquiry is described as illustrative and necessarily limited. But his
conclusions could be used as a generalization when in fact they apply
only to a single empirical case, that of 1929-1931. They may also be
misleading because they could be interpreted to mean that concen-
tration, taken as a symptom of monopoly power, is of little or no
importance for price behavior. Actually, all Ruggles himself sug-
gests is that concentration was of no apparent significance for price
behavior as he observed it in one case with what he himself terms
a limited investigation. Fuller study might fortify this conclusion,
to be sure. Yet there remain many well-known cases of rigidity,
sluggishness, and perversity, as well as other exhibits in the museum
of economic horrors. Ruggles himself is quite aware of them, but
his conclusion might suggest otherwise. In my opinion, it is likely
that his statistical scalpel was necessarily too blunt an instrument to
lay them bare.
Thus it is the adequacy of the instrument that gives me concern.
I have no quarrel whatever with Ruggles' technique for testing the
influence of concentration upon price changes in the short-period.
Quite the contrary. Further inquiry on these lines is urgently needed,
as I shall argue below. Statistical tests of this type are a kind of
screen for sifting out industries in need of more intensive study.
The difficulty is, however, that the mesh of the screen may be made
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so coarse by the available data that it may be incapable of yielding
definitive results.
Accordingly, alternative approaches become necessary, and here
the old-fashioned technique of case study acquires renewed im-
portance. Inquiry should begin with those prominent cases in which
sellers are few, to determine the nature and vigor of competition.
Within this context, several tests of competitiveness can be made.
Are there technical indivisibilities that make for few producers, or
are there other reasons? Is entry possible? If not, why not? Are
profits relatively high because of growing demand and rapid innova-
tion, or because of restrictive devices? Is there effective cross-product
competition? What kind of price policies have the rivals followed?
What has been the behavior of their price-cost relationships by
products in periods of rapidly changing demand?
The value of concentration studies of Ruggles' type is great and
beyond question. All that I wish to stress is that the problems of
competition and monopoly call for other tests and other approaches
as well, before definitive conclusions can be drawn.
I also suggest that one case, that of 1929-1931, is not enough in
itself. This, of course, Ruggles acknowledges, and he has carried
part of his study forward in time in order to broaden its scope.
Other suggestions are possible. For instances of deflation, inquiry
would be desirable and probably possible for 1920-1922, 1937-1938,
and 1948-1949. Cases of inflation also deserve investigation. Certain-
ly 1940-1942 belongs here, and at this time price and wage controls
were not effective. The period 1935-1937 might also be classed in
this group. More interesting would be the immediate postwar years,
say 1946-1948.Wagecontrol was a dead letter after August 1945,
and price control became such within a year. It would be of great
importance to see what happened to price-cost relationships, starting
from the distortions invoked by direct controls and the large back-
log of vastly increased cash holdings. No doubt there would be
difficulties. Yet here would exist a prime case in which to test the
importance of concentration for its effects upon prices in a period
of rapid change.
It may well turn out that our economic system has been, and re-
mains, far more competitive according to the standards of traditional
wage and price theory than many of us have hitherto suspected.
However, before we can adopt this view as a firm conclusion we
shall require much more work, using a variety of tools. For this
purpose, Ruggles' approach and findings are of high significance.
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